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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020343-CA 
v. : 
LIZA VICTORIA CORWELL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted tampering with evidence in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999), a third degree felony, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court should consider a claim of error which defendant did not timely 
appeal under rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and which error defendant invited? 
An appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right when defendant's notice 
of appeal is untimely and defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to extend. State v. 
Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress e\ idence 
found during a warrantless search when detectives, responding to a tip that defendant and her 
companion were involved in illegal drug activity, saw defendant's companion conceal what 
appeared to be a crack pipe and saw both occupants engaging in other suspicious behavior0 
Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, <|5, 37 
P.3d 1197 (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the trial court's conclusions of 
law based on these facts are reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. McArthur, 2000 
UT App 23,112,996 P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,854-55 (Utah 1992)). 
3. Whether this Court should consider defendant's claim that the trial court failed to 
comply with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting her guilty plea, a 
claim of error which defendant invited? 
An appellate court will decline to consider a claim of error invited by the moving 
parties affirmative action. State v. Chaney, 1999, UT App 309, [^54, 989 P.2d 1091. 
If the Court should review defendant's claim, whether the trial court strictly complied 
with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting defendant's guilty plea? 
Whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,1fl0, 983 P.2d 556. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUTES, AND RULE 
The following constitutional provision, statutes, and rule are relevant to the 
disposition of this case, are attached at Addendum A: 
2 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-8(1999); 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Liza Corwell and her codefendant, Rebecca Champneys, were charged 
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 
(1999) (R. 2-5). 
Before trial, both defendant and Ms. Champneys moved to suppress evidence obtained 
during a search of their persons and motel room (R. 49-50). Following a joint hearing, the 
trial court denied the motions (R. 47-48,66; 99:24-26).l Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty 
to attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress (R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2, 4, 14). The court 
sentenced defendant to a statutory term, not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74). 
1
 Ms. Champneys appeal, raising the same issue as defendant at Point I, is pending 
before the Court. See State v. Champneys, No. 20020123-CA. 
3 
Within thirty da>s after the entry of judgment, defendant filed a notice of appeal and 
moved to w ithdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84; 182:2-6).: The trial court revoked defendant's 
probation for failure to comply with the terms of her probation, but then reinstated probation 
upon its original terms (R. 142-43). Upon defendant's motion, this Court stayed the appeal 
and temporarily remanded the case until the trial court ruled on defendant's motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea (R. 154, 158, 160-62). The trial court denied the motion and this 
appeal ensued (R. 164, 176; 182:5-6). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
The Search and Seizure 
On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department investigated a report that defendant and a Rebecca Champneys might be 
"using and/or selling narcotics" at a motel (R. 99:2-3, 9, 63).4 The informant specifically 
2
 The caption and jurisdictional statement of defendant's opening brief states that 
her appeal is from convictions of attempted tampering with evidence and attempted 
forgery. Aplt. Br at cover and 1. However, as the plea colloquy makes clear, it was Ms. 
Champneys, and not defendant, who pleaded guilty to attempted forgery (R. 100:12-14). 
3
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the 
suppression hearing. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). The transcript of 
the hearing (R. 99:1-29) is attached at Addendum B. 
4
 The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was based largely on Detective 
Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, "Ruling," R. 63-65, attached at Addendum C). However, it was also based on the 
codefendant Champneys' and the State's memoranda and Detective Anderson's testimony 
at the preliminary hearing, a copy of which was attached to defendant Champneys' 
memorandum in support of her motion to suppress (R. 39-46, 63; 99:1; State v. 
Champneys, No. 20020123-CA, "Champneys;' R. 26-38, 39-56). The transcript of the 
preliminary hearing has been supplemented to the record in this case, is cited as 
"Champneys, R. _," and is attached at Addendum D. At the preliminary hearing, 
4 
directed the detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990 West North 
Temple Street in Salt Lake City (R. 99:2-3).5 
Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel room and knocked on the 
door - "a knock and talk" (R. 99:3). Detective Ita identified himself as "Tracy" and, after 
Ms. Champneys expressed some confusion, Ita responded that he was 'Tracy with the Salt 
Lake City Police Department'1 (R. 99:4). Also, in response to Ms. Champney's request. 
Detective Ita displayed his badge through the peep hole in the door, and Detective Anderson 
displayed his badge through an adjoining window (R. 99:4). Detective Anderson testified 
that there was a "six to twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which he 
could see into the room (R. 99:4). When the officers asked Ms. Champneys if defendant was 
also in the room, Ms. Champneys responded negatively (R. 99:5). However, after Anderson 
observed another woman in the room, Ms. Champneys admitted to him that the other woman 
was, in fact, defendant Lisa Corwell (R. 99:5). 
After the detectives displayed their badges and asked to open the door, Ms. 
Champneys unsuccessfully tried to close the gap in the curtains (R. 99:6). At the same 
Detective Anderson asserted that the informant said that the occupants of a motel room, 
defendant and Champneys, were involved with illegal drugs (Champneys, R. 40, 47-48). 
5
 The trial court treated the informant as "anonymous," although the evidence was 
various on this point (R. 99:24). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson stated 
that information concerning defendant's illegal drug activity came from her husband 
(Champneys, R. 48). Also, Ms. Champneys supporting memorandum asserts that the 
detectives "knew nothing about the tip except the person stated he was [defendant's] 
husband" (Champneys, R. 36). However, at the suppression hearing, Detective Anderson 
stated that he did not recall if the informant had identified himself (R. 99:3, 9). 
According to Detective Anderson, Detective Ita, who did not testify, received the 
informant's call (R. 99:2). 
5 
instant, from about five to ten feet, Detective Anderson saw defendant put what he thought 
was a crack pipe into a purse and then put it behind the bed (R. 99:4, 6-7, 15). Anderson 
testified that he "initially thought it was a crack pipe. It was a metallic object that looked the 
size and shape of a crack pipe" (R. 99:6). On cross examination, Anderson firmly asserted 
several times that he "thought it was a crack pipe," consistent with his preliminary hearing 
testimony (99:12; Champneys, R. 41,49-50). When Detective Anderson later searched the 
purse, he found only a spoon (R. 99:12). 
Detective Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room" - - "[both women] 
running around the room . . . both [going] into the bathroom [at least three times each] . . . 
putting stuff behind the bed . . . under the bed" (R. 99:4, 7). Defendant's and Ms. 
Champneys' trips to the bathroom were significant to Detective Anderson because, in his 
experience, people in hotels often try to flush narcotics down the toilet (R. 99:7). 
The detectives repeatedly asked Ms. Champneys to open the door (R. 99:3, 6, 8). 
Because she refused, Detective Ita obtained a key from the motel manager, who directed the 
detectives to evict the women if they were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 99:7-8). Even 
with the key the detectives were unable to enter the room because the women had engaged 
the dead-bolt (R. 99:8). When Ms. Champneys repeatedly refused to open the door, 
Detective Ita kicked it open (R. 99:8). 
Once inside the room, Detective Anderson applied a twist lock to Ms. Champneys, 
arrested her, and put her in flexible plastic handcuffs {Champneys, R. 43). Ms. Champneys 
was placed in custody by other officers {Champneys, R. 43). In Ms. Champneys' right rear 
6 
pocket. Detective Anderson found a metallic pipe, which she admitted she used to smoke 
cocaine (Champneys, R. 43). Ms. Champneys became extremely hostile, demanding to be 
searched by a female officer (Champneys, R. 43). When Detective Anderson learned that 
a female officer was en route to the scene, he stopped searching Ms. Champneys 
(Champneys, R. 43). 
When Officer Patty Roberts arrived, she searched both defendant and Champneys 
(Champneys, R. 44, 47). On defendant, she found a rock of cocaine and drug paraphernalia 
(Champneys, R. 53). On Champneys, Officer Roberts found a twist or baggie and a contact 
case containing substances which tested positively for cocaine in her bra and Kleenex and 
a burnt brillo pad in her pants (Champneys,R. 44). 
While being searched in the bathroom, Champneys grabbed some of the cocaine from 
the counter and tried to flush it down the drain (Champneys, R. 45). A brief struggled ensued 
(Champneys, R. 45). When Officer Roberts asked defendant what had happened to the twist, 
Champneys asserted that it had fallen down the drain, but Officer Roberts found it in 
Champneys' hand (Champneys, R. 46). 
The Plea-taking6 
After the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion, defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted tampering with evidence in exchange for the right 
to preserve her appeal of the trial court's ruling and the dismissal of the remaining charges 
(R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2-4,14). 
6
 The transcript of the plea-taking (R. 100:1-16) is attached at Addendum E. 
7 
On December 7,2001, the trial court conducted a joint change of plea hearing of both 
defendant and Ms. Champneys (R. 100:1). Ms. Champneys' counsel, in both defendant's and 
Ms. Champneys' presence, first informed the court that both defendants were going to plead 
guilty to attempted tampering with evidence under State v. Sen\ "reserving their right to 
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress" (R. 100:2). Thereafter, in both defendants' 
presence, the trial court began the pleacolloquy by emphasizing that their right to appeal was 
being conditionally preserved through a "Sery" plea: "[S]o everybody is clear on that, [it] 
means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1, 4).7 Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's 
clarification: 'That's correct" (R. 100:4). The court then elicited from counsel that a change 
of plea statement had been prepared for defendant, that counsel had reviewed the statement 
with defendant, and that counsel believed defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4; 
Statement of Defendant, R. 56-62, attached at Addendum F). 
Addressing both defendant and Ms. Champneys, the court indicated that it would ask 
each of them questions (R. 100:4). Thereafter, the court conducted a plea colloquy of both 
defendants, alternating its questions to each defendant and receiving each defendant's answer 
in turn (R. 100:4-15). The court first emphasized that it needed to be sure that defendant had 
plenty of time to discuss the content of the plea statement with her attorney because she 
would be surrendering rights in pleading guilty (R. 100:5). Defendant assured the court that 
she had had plenty of time to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed 
7
 See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
8 
she understood the statement (R. 100:5). In response to the court's specific questions, 
defendant acknowledged her understanding of the following: 
• pleading guilty to a third degree felony potentially subjected her to a 
maximum five-year sentence in the Utah State Prison and a fine as high 
asS5,000(R. 100:5-6); 
• the court had not yet made up its mind on defendant's sentence and would 
decide the sentence only after reading the presentence report and hearing 
what all counsel and she had to say (R. 100:6-7); 
• in giving up the right to a trial, scheduled for the following Monday, she 
important constitutional and statutory rights outlined in her statement 
(R. 100:7); 
• by pleading guilty, there would be no trial the following Monday (R. 100:7); 
• she wanted to give up her right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7); 
• if there was a trial she would have the right, thought she would not be 
required, to testify and tell her story to a jury and that by not having a 
trial she would not be able to testify (R. 100:7-8); 
• by pleading guilty she would give up her right to confront her accusers, 
witnesses that the State would call to prove her guilt of the charged 
offense (R. 100:8); 
• by pleading guilty her attorney would be unable to cross examine the 
State's witnesses to test their credibility (R. 100:8); 
• the court presumed she was innocent and that the court would require a 
jury, if the case were tried, to presume similarly until and unless the 
State proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:8-9); 
• by pleading guilty she lost her right to the presumption of innocence 
and that she wanted to give up that right (R. 100:9); 
• by pleading guilty she gave up the opportunity to defend herself and 
to require the State to meet the high standard of proving her guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:9-10); 
9 
• she was pleading guilty to attempted tampering with evidence, a third 
degree felony, which she and Champnevs had committed on March 13, 
2001, by attempting to alter, destroy or conceal evidence, believing 
that an official investigation was going on (R. 100:10); 
• on March 13, 2001, at 1990 West North Temple Street, she and 
Champneys, after seeing police officers and communicating with 
them verbally, attempted to conceal materials (R. 100:10); 
• she believed she was guilty of the offense she was pleading guilty to 
(R. 100:11). 
The court then confirmed that defendant had not consumed alcoholic beverages in the 
past twenty-four hours, was not under the influence of any drugs, and that she believed she 
was thinking clearly (R. 100:11). The court also elicited from defendant that nothing in the 
court's discussion was unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty 
plea (R. 100:12). The trial court asked defense counsel, "[A]nything else either one of you 
would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments?" (R. 100:12). Counsel for 
Champneys said, "No" (R. 100:12). Counsel for defendant said, "I have nothing, Your 
Honor" (R. 100:12). Following Champneys' plea-taking, the court accepted defendant's 
guilty plea to attempted tampering with evidence, signed defendant's statement, and observ ed 
that their appeared to be a factual basis for the plea (R. 100:13-14). The court then expressed 
its belief that defendant understood the rights she was surrendering and the attendant 
consequences and that defendant had entered her plea voluntarily (R. 100:14-15). Before 
concluding the proceedings, the trial court informed defendant that she had the right to be 
sentenced in not less than two days but not more than forty-five days (R. 100:15). 
10 
On April 2, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate five-year 
term in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation 
(R. 72-74). On April 26, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 75). On April 29, defendant 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 84). Specifically, defendant claimed that she did not 
understand the different ramifications between pleading guilty to a felony as opposed to a 
misdemeanor (R. 120). She also alleged that her plea was involuntary because the trial court 
had not conducted the plea colloquy in strict compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, by failing to advise her of (1) the right to a speedy public trial, (2) the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, (3) that her right to appeal would be 
limited by the entry of a guilty plea, and (4) the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
the plea (R. 120-23; 182:2-6). 
On June 5, 2002, defendant filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in 
abeyance and to stay the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to withdraw guilty 
plea" (R. 158-62). In her motion, defendant stated that if the trial court denied her motion 
to withdraw her guilty plea she "plan[ned] to appeal the denial of the motion to this 
Courf'and would then request that this Court consolidate her two appeals (R. 162). On June 
20, this Court stayed the appeal and temporarily remanded the case until the trial court ruled 
on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea ("Stay order," R. 154, attached at 
Addendum G). 
In granting the stay, this Court stated: "If the trial court denies the motion, Appellant 
shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate case number" (R. 154). The 
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trial court denied the motion (R 164, 176, 182 5-6) Defendant filed a supplemental 
designation of record, supplemental certificate, and a supplemental request for transcript (R 
167-72) No amended notice of appeal appears in the record. 
The trial court heard defendant's motion to withdraw her plea on June 21, 2002 (R 
164, 182.1). Defense counsel conceded at the outset that defendant's not understanding the 
difference between felony and misdemeanor probation "doesn't seem like it's a basis for the 
withdrawal of the plea," and the tnal court agreed (R. 182.3, 5). Counsel also acknowledged 
that he had looked at the plea statement and that defendant had said she read and understood 
it (R. 182:3). However, counsel asserted that defendant's motion was based on the tnal 
court's failure to expressly mention four rule 11 nghts dunng the plea colloquy (R. 182.4) 
Although counsel acknowledged that the colloquy could be properly supplemented by 
reference to defendant's plea statement, he asserted that the statement failed to mention the 
nght to speedy tnal (R. 182:4). The tnal court observed that the plea was taken on a Fnday 
and that defendant had been informed that the tnal was set for the following Monday, 
commenting, "Can't get much speedier than that" (R. 182.4-5). Defense counsel agreed with 
the court's comment and acknowledged that the court had informed defendant of the 
imminent tnal setting (R. 182:5). The court then found that defendant's rule 11 nghts had 
been properly explained to her through the oral colloquy in conjunction with defendant's 
statement (R. 182:5). The court also found that its omission dunng the colloquy of any nghts 
referenced by defendant was harmless (R. 182:5). Specifically, the court noted that the plea 
statement expressly informed defendant that a motion to withdraw her plea must be filed 
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within thirty days of her sentencing and that the court's hearing the matter negated an> harm 
(R. 182:5). Similarly, the court observed that its failure to inform defendant that it could 
impose consecutive sentences was irrelevant since defendant had pleaded guilty to a single 
offense (R. 182:5). The court then denied defendant's motion, concluding that defendant's 
plea was made "knowingly and voluntarily" (R. 177-78 at 178; 182:5).8 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant failed to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea, a necessary prerequisite for appeal under rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal on this issue and 
defendant's challenge to the trial court's denial of her motion must be dismissed. 
POINT II 
The trial court properly upheld a warrantless search of defendant's motel room 
because the detectives performing the search had probable cause that defendant was involved 
in illegal drug activity and exigent circumstances justified an immediate entry. In addition 
to the reliability and content of the tip that directed the detectives to the motel room, probable 
cause was established when one of the detectives observed defendant try to hide what 
reasonably appeared to be a crack pipe, followed by defendant's and her companion's 
apparent efforts to hide evidence and bar the detectives from entering. 
8
 The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, R. 
182:1-6, is attached at Addendum H. The trial court's order denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw her plea and findings of fact and conclusions of law, R. 176-78, are attached 
at Addendum I. 
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Additionally, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the motel room 
Defendant and her companion were engaging in behavior that led the officers to reasonablv 
believe that evidence was being destroyed, precluding their obtaining a warrant in time to 
preserve the evidence. 
POINT HI 
Defendant invited any error in the trial court's failing to strictly comply with the 
requirements of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant prepared and 
submitted a plea statement, on which the trial court relied, that was deficient in those rule 11 
requirements defendant claims the cour. committed plain error in omitting. Because 
defendant affirmatively led the trial court into any error, this Court should decline to consider 
defendant's claim. 
In any event, the trial court strictly complied with rule 11(e). Under State v Visser, 
2000 UT 88, 22 P,3d 1242, a trial court strictly complies with rule 11 if a defendant's 
experience communicates as much as an oral recitation of rights. Id. atf 13. Defendant was 
made amply aware through the plea colloquy and her properly incorporated plea statement 
that her right of appeal the denial of her motion to suppress was preserved, a right she plainly 
exercised. Also, by clearly and repeatedly informing defendant that by pleading guilty she 
was giving up her right to trial, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court 
effectively communicated to defendant her right to a speedy trial. 
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ARGLMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT LACKS JLRISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal following the entry of a judgment of conviction 
for attempted tampering with evidence, but failed to subsequently file an amended notice of 
appeal from the final order of the trial court denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea 
Defendant was on notice that rule 4 (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, required that she 
file a notice of appeal after the tnal court ruled on her motion That motion, as explained 
below, was tantamount to a motion for a new tnal. Consequently, defendant's notice of 
appeal was premature and of no effect. Therefore, this Court lacks junsdiction to consider 
defendant's challenge to the tnal court's ruling. 
Under rule 4, an appeal of right "shall be filed . . within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a) "If an appeal is not 
timely filed, this court lacks junsdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato v Utah Transit Auth , 
2000 UT App 299,1J7, 13 P.3d 616; State v Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App 1989) 
(appellate court lacks junsdiction to hear appeal as of nght when defendant's notice of appeal 
is untimely and defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to extend) Because defendant's 
claims on appeal lie outside the Court's junsdiction, the Court has authonty to only dismiss 
the appeal Vanan-Eimac, Inc v Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App 1989). 
A. The factual background. 
After the tnal court denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained in an alleged 
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illegal search, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted tampering with 
e\ idence reserving her right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion (R 
53,63-66,100 2) On April 2,2002, judgment was entered (R 72) On April 26, defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal to the judgment (R 75) 
However, on April 29, defendant moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R 84) On June 
5, 2002, defendant filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in abeyance and to stay 
the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to withdraw guilty plea" (R 158-62) 
In her motion, defendant stated that if the tnal court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea she "plan[ned] to appeal the denial of the motion to this CourTand would then request 
that this Court consolidate "her appeals from her conviction and the denial of her motion" 
(R 162) 
On June 20, this Court stayed the appeal and temporarily remanded the case until the 
trial court ruled on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea (Stay Order, R 154, 
attached at Addendum G). In granting the stay, this Court stated "If the tnal court denies 
the motion, Appellant shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate case 
number" (R 154) On June 21, the tnal court denied the motion from the bench (R. 164, 
Transcnpt of heanng, R. 182:5-6, attached at Addendum H). On September 10, defendant 
filed a supplemental designation of record, a supplemental certificate, and a supplemental 
9
 The tnal court signed a document entitled, "Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment" ("Judgment") on March 29, 2002 (R. 68) However, a copy of that 
document was not docketed until Apnl 2, 2002 (R 72) Because "entry" of judgment 
requires both execution and docketing, see e g , Nelson v Stoker, 669 P 2d 390, 392-93 
(Utah 1980), defendant's notice of appeal was timely as to the "March 29M judgment 
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request for transcript (R. 167-72). The final order denying the motion and findings o( fact 
and conclusions of law, prepared at the trial court's direction, were not entered until October 
11, 2002 (Order and Findings, R. 176-78, attached at Addendum I). No amended notice of 
appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea appears in the 
record. 
B. A notice of appeal filed before a final order disposing of a post-judgment 
motion is premature and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction. 
On facts similar to those in this case, the Utah Supreme Court in Swenson Assocs 
Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994), found that failure to timely file a notice 
of appeal following a post-judgment order deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction. In 
Swenson, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss Swenson's complaint. Id. at 
416. Before the final order of dismissal was entered, Swenson moved to amend the findings 
of fact and for a new trial under rules 52(b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
respectively. Id. The trial court denied the motions and directed the State to prepare an 
order. Id. Soon after, the final order of dismissal was entered and Swenson timely appealed 
from that order. Id. However, when the order denying Swenson's motions to amend the 
findings and for a new trial was later prepared and entered, Swenson failed to file a notice 
of appeal from that order. Id. 
The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Swenson's appeal under 
rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. With respect to rules 52(b) and 59, and rule 
24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (motion for a new trial), rule 4(b) provides: 
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the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denv ing 
a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion . . . . A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured/ram the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. [Emphasis added.] 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b). Citing this Court with approval, Swenson restated the rule relating to 
premature filing of a notice of appeal of post-judgment motions: 
[Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) ] requires a new notice of appeal to be 
filed after entry of an order disposing of a post-judgment motion. Filing of a 
post-judgment motion of the types listed in [rule 4(b) ] suspends the finality of 
the judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of such a motion 
by entry of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate 
court. 
Swenson, 889 P.2d at 417 (quoting Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah 
App. 1988) (per curiam) (brackets in original). See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264,265 (Utah 
1997) (applying rule 4(b) to conclude lack of appellate jurisdiction of ruling denying motion 
for new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). Cf State v. Gardner, 2001 
UT 41, ^|10, 23 P.3d 1043 (same result where notice of appeal filed, but no final order 
denying motion for new trial found in record). 
C. Rule 4(b) expressly identified a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a 
post-judgment motion requiring the filing of a timely notice of appeal. 
Any argument that defendant was unaware that he should have filed another notice 
of appeal is defeated by the express language of rule rule4 (b). On November 1, 2002, 
twenty-one days after the trial court issued its order denying defendant's motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea, amended rule 4 (b) became effective. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) amendment notes. 
That current, amended rule states: "[I]f a timely motion is filed in the trial court . . . (2) to 
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withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order . . . denying the motion to withdraw the plea ." Utah R. App. P. 
4(b). Thus, defendant technically had express notice that she was required to file a second 
notice of appeal within nine days of the rule's effective date. Even if the Court concluded 
that such notice was insufficient, defendant should not be relieved of the rule's specialized 
notice-of-appeal filing requirements on post-judgment motions. 
Utah's appellate courts have regularly deemed various post-judgment motions to fall 
within the express categories identified in rule 4(b). See Gardner, 2001 UT 41, at 117 
(construing motion for reconsideration of pre-judgment motion to suppress a motion for new 
trial) (citing Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, (Utah 1991) ('"exception to 
order and motion for reconsideration' was properly treated as motion for new trial")). In 
State v. Culley, this Court construed a post-judgment motion to declare a misplea as a motion 
for a new trial under rule 4(b), summarily dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State 
v. Culley, 2001 UT App 124 (per curiam) (unpublished opinion cited under Grand County 
v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25 at 1fl[7, 16, 44 P.3d 734 (approving citation to useful unpublished 
opinions that reflect well-established law)) (attached at Addendum J).10 In this case, the 
10
 There are policy reasons also for treating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, 
especially a post-judgment plea withdrawal motion, like a motion for a new trial. A 
conviction following the entry of a guilty plea is the equivalent of an conviction following 
a verdict. See State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977) (once a plea of guilty is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, there are no issues for trial and right to jury trial is 
waived); State v. Stewartf\l\ P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1946) (a plea of guilty amounts to a 
"conviction"). Moreover, the reversal of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea (followed by defendant's actually withdrawing his guilty plea) has the same 
effect as a reversal of a conviction: defendant is subject to a new trial. State v. Maguire, 
857P.2d598, 600. (Utah 1998). 
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Court implicitly recognized that defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea was to be 
treated as a post-judgment motion under rule 4(b) vv hen it expressly directed defendant to file 
an amended notice of appeal if the trial court denied the motion (R. 154). 
In this case, defendant committed the same procedural error as defendants in S\\ enson, 
Anderson, and Jiminez - failure to file a notice of appeal to an order on a post-judgment 
motion. That error is more egregious in light of (1) defendant's own acknowledgment that 
at issue were separate appeals of the denial of her motion to suppress evidence and her post-
judgment motion to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 162), and (2) this Court's express directiv e 
to file an amended notice of appeal if the trial court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea(R. 154). 
In sum, because defendant failed to file a notice of appeal following the entry of the 
trial court's order of October 11,2002, denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenge to the trial court's rulings denying 
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her motion to suppress and to withdraw her guilty plea and her appeal must be dismissed. 
In any event, defendant's claims are without merit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND BY DETECTIVES 
DURING A SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM BECAUSE 
THE SEARCH WAS SUPPORTED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant claims that the police violated her right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures because they lacked both probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
search her hotel room. Br. Aplt. 15-21. Contrary to defendant's claim, the search conducted 
by the detectives was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of that 
search. 
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 Even if this Court should, for some reason, construe defendant's first notice of 
appeal to independently preserve her right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, 
it should readily find that it lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of her 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. As set out above, rule 4(b) expressly requires a 
defendant to file a notice of appeal from a final judgment or order. By no stretch of the 
imagination could defendant's post-sentence notice of appeal be considered timely as to 
the trial court's order denying her motion to withdraw his guilty plea. That notice of 
appeal was plainly never intended to perfect defendant's appeal from any prospective trial 
court order at the time it was filed on April 26, 2001: that notice of appeal was filed three 
days before defendant moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84), a month and a half 
before she acknowledged to this court that she distinguished her appeal from the denial of 
the motion to suppress (R. 162), almost two months before the trial court heard the matter 
(R. 164), and five and a half months before the final order denying his motion issued (R. 
176). Additionally, this Court specifically ordered defendant to file an amended notice of 
appeal if the trial court denied her motion (R. 154). Notwithstanding this Court's express 
directive, defendant evidently never filed a notice of appeal with respect to the trial 
court's order denying her motion. Therefore, this Court should find, at the very least, that 
it lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim and dismiss the appeal as to that issue. 
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'"[Pjrobable cause alone is never enough to search . . . and seize without a warrant *' 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). "However, '[a] warrantless search of a 
residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are 
proven." State v. Yoder% 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
A. The search was supported by probable cause that 
defendant and her companion were engaged in illegal activity. 
Probable cause exists where '"the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being 
committed.'" State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at^ f 21,51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Dorsey\ 
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in 
original). 'The probable cause determination is based on the 'totality of the circumstances.'" 
Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (citing State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187 (Utah App. 1994)). The 
appellate court reviews the trial court's underlying findings of fact for clear error; it reviews 
the trial court's determination of probable cause for correctness, "giving the trial court a 
measure of discretion 'to apply the standard to the particular set of facts in the case.'" Id. 
(quoting Nguyen, at 1186). 
/. Based only on their observations of defendant's participation in patently 
criminal conduct, the detectives had probable cause to search the motel room. 
Defendant argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to enter and search the 
premises, based on this Court's analytic framework in State v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah 
App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion), and State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,37 P.3d 260, 
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w hich applies that framework to the determination of probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. See 
Mulcah\\ 943 P.2d at 235-36 (identifying three determinative factors for probable cause 
when police are relying on an informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved/' 2) 
''whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support 
a stop," and 3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's 
report on the informants tip."). That framework, which places a premium on the "tip" which 
initiates an official investigation, is inapposite to this case. Here, probable cause was not 
based primarily on the tip, but rather on the detectives' observations of defendant's criminal 
conduct from a lawful position outside the motel room. 
In Valenzuela, this Court stated: 
Here, because the State predicates its probable cause argument upon 
information received from an informant, "we must examine the 'totality of the 
circumstances' to determine whether the informant's tip, together with police 
observations, provided probable cause to arrest" Valenzuela. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 1|11 (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gates v. 
Illinois, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)))(emphasis added). "Predicate" 
means "to affirm or base upon facts, arguments, conditions, etc." Webster's New World 
Dictionary 1149 (Coll. ed. 1957). The record shows that probable cause was hardly based 
on the tip. 
Detectives Anderson and Ita proceeded to the Motel 6 based on a tip that defendant 
and another woman, later determined to be Champneys, might be using and/or selling 
narcotics (R. 99:2-3, 91). The trial court gave short shrift to the tip, discussing it in only the 
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first of its thirteen findings of fact (bench ruling, 99:24-26; Ruling, R. 63-65, attached at 
Addenda B and C). As such, the court implicitly recognized that the tip only initiated the 
detectives' investigation. See State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) (officer's 
overhearing and viewing suspicious behavior relating to illegal drug use gave rise to duty to 
investigate). See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (holding that police must corroborate 
anonymous tip). The court specifically observed, "Had the officers not been able to see into 
the room then of course they would not have had the right to enter the room. They couldn't 
have gotten a warrant. But what they saw was evidence or what at least Officer Anderson 
saw, was evidence of the commission of a crime" (R. 99:25). Thus, the trial court upheld the 
entr> into the motel room and ensuing search because they were justified by probable cause 
based not primarily on the tip, but on the detectives' observations of defendant's and 
Champneys's actions in plain view . See State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 
1998) ("A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, 
(2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating.") (citation omitted). 
Defendant does not claim that Detectives Anderson and Ita violated her rights by 
merely speaking with Champneys from outside the closed door of her motel room during a 
"knock and talk," nor did they (R. 49; 99:3). See United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 
1059-60 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 152 (2001) (" Law enforcement officers may 
encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the 
occupants."); United States v. Davis, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Absent express 
orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private 
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or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right 
of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock 
on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the 
occupant thereof— whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.") 
The trial court found that a tip that drugs were being dealt from a motel room "certainly gives 
the officers the right to go over and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want 
to talk with them," a finding defendant does not dispute (R. 99:24). 
Further, defendant does not dispute that the crack pipe Detective Anderson saw and 
defendant's highly suspicious conduct was in his plain view and, therefore, the fruit of an 
legal search. "It is well established law that a government official does not engage in a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if he observes incriminating evidence from a 
place where he has a right to be." State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983) (finding 
lawful right to observe "extends to . . . front doors and other open areas accessible to the 
public at large."); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) ("We have 
held that officers walking up to the front door of a house can look inside through a partially 
draped open window without conducting a Fourth Amendment search."); United States v. 
Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir.) (viewing inculpatory evidence of illegal drug activity in 
plain view through partially curtained windows of residence not an illegal "search" within 
purview of Fourth Amendment), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1008,1059-60,93 S. Ct. 442 (1972). 
Consequently, defendant does not dispute the well-established rule that, assuming exigent 
circumstances, police may seize incriminating evidence observed in plain view. 
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Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's findings and conclusions, arguing that 
what the detectives observed was not incriminating -- that it did not constitute probable cause 
to break into the motel room and to search. Aplt. Br. at 19. That argument runs counter to 
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact and sound conclusions of law. 
Detective Anderson consistently testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, that he saw defendant try to conceal what he believed was 
a crack pipe (R. 27,35,41; 99:4,6,11 -12). The trial court correctly recognized that although 
Detective Anderson was apparently wrong about actually seeing a "crack pipe," the error was 
immaterial because his belief was reasonable: 
It turned out he was wrong as to this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when 
he thought it was a crack pipe[J but I don't find anything inherently 
unreasonable about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even 
though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong is not important. It's what 
he reasonably thought it was at the time . . . and I'm satisfied that Officer 
Anderson, by what he saw, thought that he observed a [sic] drug paraphernalia. 
(R. 99:25).12 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e), at 37 (3d ed. 1996) 
noting probable cause may be supported by a reasonable mistake) (citing Maryland v. 
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1018 (1987) (recognizing "the need to allow 
some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult 
process of making arrests")); United States v. Gonzales, 969 F. 2d 999, 1004(1 lth Cir. 1992) 
(holding that officer's identification of the defendant's wife acting suspiciously "was 
ultimately found to be mistaken does not detract from the contribution this impression - // 
12
 The State does not concede that Detective Anderson was mistaken. Although 
only a spoon was found in the purse, a crack pipe was found in Champneys's pocket 
{99:\2\ Champneys, R. 43). 
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his mistake was objectively reasonable -made at the time to the totality of the circumstances 
leading to probable cause"); State v. Keitz* 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1993) (plain view 
test for "clearly incriminating" evidence requires "an officer must only have a reasonable 
belief 'that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a 
crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct'") (citations omitted), 
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994). 
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to "use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body." Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1999). When Detective Anderson saw defendant 
attempt to hide the "crack pipe," he saw her engaged in illegal activity. At that point, the 
detectives were justified in arresting and searching her. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999) 
("A peace officer may . . ., without warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense 
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer;" or (3) when he has reasonable 
cause to believe the person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may . . . (b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
offense). 
Champneys's actions also justified the detectives in arresting her as a party to 
defendant's illegal activity and searching her.13 See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,227-28 
(Utah App. 1995) (finding probable cause to arrest and search incident to arrest for 
13
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) ("Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes 
an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.") 
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possession of marijuana upon the defendant's e\ asive conduct and attempt to hide something 
and experienced officer's detecting odor of marijuana, which defendant denied smoking). 
The trial court findings, undisputed by defendant, are that at essentially the same time 
that defendant put the "crack pipe" into her purse, "fb/oth defendants were running around 
the room, putting items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the 
bathroom" (R. 92). From the bench, the court observed, 
Then, when I add to [Detective Anderson's belief that he saw a crack 
pipe] the fact that when they . . . identified themselves as police officers, the 
activity starts in the room that is consistent, may be consistent with cleaning 
up the room[,] but that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under 
the circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of controlled 
substances. The officer testified that in his opinion, and it doesn't take a 
rocket scientist to know that, because controlled substances are disposable by 
flushing them down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things about, 
going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause to enter the room and 
it also, because of the nature of the conduct, provides the sufficient exigent 
circumstances to kick in the door. 
(R. 25-26). The trial court also found that Champneys refused to open the door and applied 
a deadbolt even after the detectives told her that they would force it open (R. 92). In sum, 
the detectives' direct observations of Champneys' criminal conduct sufficiently support the 
trial court's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe she too was involved in 
illegal drug activity. Applying the MulcahylValenzuela analysis only strengthens that 
conclusion. 
2. The informant *s tip, taken with Officer Anderson 's observations, 
amply established probable cause to enter and search the motel room. 
As noted above, this Court in Valenzuela applied its analysis of reasonable suspicion 
to justify a traffic stop in Mulcahy, to determine probable cause when the police rely on an 
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informant's tip: I) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2) "whether the informant gave 
enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop," and 3) "whether the 
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report on the informants tip." 
Valenzuela 2001 UT App 332, at 1115. at 235, 236. This Court found its approach in 
weighing these factors, "consistent with the recent Utah Supreme Court decision embracing 
the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis articulated in Gates" Id. at 1J17 (citing State v 
Anderson,9\0P.2d 1229,1233 (Utah 1996)). See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at 1121, 
40 P.3d 1136 (holding that minimal corroboration of the informant's tip was sufficient 
because the reliability of the information was high); Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, at 1(31 
(finding under the totality of the circumstances that a police officer did not have probable 
cause to arrest the defendant because information supplied by the informant was insufficient 
by itself and the officer had not corroborated the report). 
In this case, the strength of probable cause grows with consideration of each 
successive factor, until, as argued at Point I.A.I, above, the detectives' direct observations 
fully and independently confirm the tip, that defendant and her companion were engaged in 
illegal activity involving narcotics. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 ("The officer may 
corroborate the tip . . . by observing the illegal activity!.]") (citation omitted). 
The first Mulcahy factor - the informant's identity 
Mulcahy first looks at the identity of the informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. In 
Mulcahy, the police informant was an ordinary citizen who identified himself to police 
dispatch. Id. at 233. This Court held that an "ordinary citizen-informant needs no 
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independent proof of reliability or veracity. Id. at 235 (quotations and citations omitted) 
This is because a citizen informant volunteers information, not for personal benefit, but out 
of concern for the community and because an identified citizen informant is exposed to 
liability if the information is false. Id. 
In this case, the classification of the informant is unclear. While Detective Anderson 
clearly testified at the preliminary hearing that the tip came from defendant's husband, he 
was unable at the suppression hearing to recall whom the tip came from (Champneys, R. 47-
48; 99:3, 9). The trial court treated the tip an "anonymous" (R. 91; 99:24). Although an 
anonymous tip is "toward the lower end of the reliability scale," it may still support a finding 
of probable cause in when balanced with the other circumstances. Anonymous tips have an 
important place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "[S]uch tips, particularly when 
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contnbute to the solution of 
otherwise 'perfect crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38, 103 S. Ct. at 2334-36 (finding 
probable caused where anonymous tip was detailed and substantially corroborated by police 
investigation). Here, like the citizen informant in Mulcahy, there is no evidence that the 
informant stood to gain by supplying the police with information. Moreover the reliability 
of the anonymous tip was augmented by its detail and ultimate corroboration. 
The second Mulcahy factor - the level of detail supplied by the informant 
The second factor in the Mulcahy analysis is the level of detail given by the informant. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Again, because probable cause was established by the detective's 
direct observations, only a low level of detail is required to justify the search. 
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In Mulcahy, the informant told the police that a drunk individual, possibK named 
"Joe," had been at the informant's front door and had driven away in a white car, "mavbe" 
a Toyota Cehca. Id. at 233. He also told the dispatcher the direction the car was headed and 
supplied, what he believed was, "Joe's" phone number. Id. This Court found that the 
informant "supplied sufficient detail to support a stop and detention," even though the officer 
observed no traffic violations or signs of intoxication. Id. at 234, 238. 
In a pre-Mulcahy case, the Utah Supreme Court found probable cause for a roadside 
arrest and vehicle search on details given in a tip comparable to those in Mulcahy. See 
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. In that case, the defendant's girlfriend reported to the police 
that the defendant had gone to Las Vegas to purchase methamphetamine. Id. at 1230. She 
also told police that the defendant and a companion would be returning to Millard County 
the following afternoon, in the defendant's Cadillac, via highway 257. Id. She then 
indicated that the defendant might be armed. Id. The following day, a second, confidential 
informant, confirmed the information the defendant's girlfriend had given the police. Id. 
The court found that the reliability of the girlfriend's statement was high because she 
supplied a substantial amount of detail. Id. at 1233. Additionally, her statement was verified 
in almost every aspect by the second informant. Id. 
The detail supplied by the informant in this case is comparable to that in Mulcahy and 
Anderson. In this case, defendant's husband told dispatch that "Lisa and Rebecca[, 
defendant,] were in room 236" of the Motel 6 located at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake (R. 
40; 99:2-3). The informant told the police that these women were "engaging in illegal 
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activit} - either using or selling narcotics" (R. 34; 99:2). Like the officers in both Muk ah\ 
and Anderson, the detectives were told the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the number 
of possible suspects engaged in the illegal activity, the precise location of crime and the 
suspects, and the type of criminal behavior those suspects were engaging in. Although, the 
informant did not state his basis of knowledge concerning the information, the detectives 
would reasonably have relied on a family member's report presumably based on first-hand 
observation. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at [^19 (family member's tip concerning the 
defendant's use of a methamphetamine lab significant because it based on personal 
observation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238 (crediting informant's tip about drunk driver because 
it was evidently based on first hand observations). In sum, the informant's tip was 
sufficiently detailed to support a finding of probable cause when supplemented with the 
detectives' corroborating observations. 
The third Mulcahy factor - the police officer's confirmation of the tip 
'The officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by 
finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant." 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted). In Mulcahy, the tip alerted police to an alleged 
drunken driver, but the investigating officer did not observe signs of intoxication in the 
defendant's driving pattern. Id. at 233. Consequently, this Court focused on the second 
means of corroboration, the confirmation of the "innocent details" to establish the tip's 
reliability. Id. at 236 (citing State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). Since 
criminals naturally tend to hide their illegal activity, Utah courts have regularly taken the tack 
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used in Mulcahy. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (concluding that because "officers had 
personally verified every aspect of the informants' reports except whether [the defendants] 
were actually transporting methamphetamine . . ., the police could justifiably conclude that 
the rest of the reports would also be true"); DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, at 1J20 (recognizing 
difficulty of confirming tip about family member's methamphetamine lab where police could 
not observe the alleged illegal activity or the facts provided by informants without entering 
the defendant's apartment); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah App. 1992) 
(upholding probable cause to support search warrant where police confirmed all information 
supplied by informant except that pertaining to physical evidence of dmg use and 
manufacture). 
Lacking direct observations of illegal conduct, this Court has held that 
"[corroboration by the police officer means, in light of the circumstances, [that] he confirms 
enough facts so that he may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable." 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 1995)) 
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Utah's appellate courts have found official 
corroboration of a tip sufficient on far slimmer facts than in this case. See Anderson, 910 
P.2d at 1233 (the defendant's name, vehicle make, route, destination, date and time of 
departure and arrival); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237-38 (vehicle color, route, direction of travel, 
time of departure); Purser, 828 P.2d at 518 (the defendant's address, vehicle registration, 
police record, foot traffic to and from the defendant's house). 
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In contradistinction to those cases referenced above, the detectives in this case 
corroborated the reliability of the tip not only by confirming all of the innocent details, but 
also by observing defendant's illegal conduct. The tip informed Detectives Anderson and Ita 
that defendant and Champneys were involved in illegal drug activity in room 236 at the 
Motel 6 at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake City (99:2-3; Champneys, R. 40) The detectives 
went to the motel room identified by the informant and confirmed that two females were m 
the motel room and that those women were defendant and Champneys (R. 99 3-5, 
Champneys R. 41). In accord with the tnal court's findings, the State acknowledges that at 
this point the detectives lacked probable cause to search (R. 99:25). However, Detective 
Anderson contemporaneously observed defendant and Champneys involved in plainly illegal 
drug-related activity, hiding drug paraphernalia. See Aple. Br. at Pt. IIA1, above. In sum, 
the totality of the detectives' observations amply confirmed the reliability of the tip and 
supported probable cause to both arrest and search defendant and Champneys. 
B. Defendant's behavior created exigent circumstances, 
justifying the warrantless search of the motel room. 
The Fourth Amendment adopts a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant 
to a warTant.,, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Thus, 
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573,586,100 S. Ct. 1371,1380 (1980); CityofOrem v Henri, 
868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1994). However, "[police entry into a house without a 
warrant is not [ ] always unreasonable." Murdoch v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir 
1995) 
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One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances exception. 
New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3 (1984). Under this 
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involve[ ] a plausible claim of 
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois 
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these circumstances, "4the 
exigencies of the situation' make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 
S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) {quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct. 
191, 193 (1948)). "Exigent circumstances exist 'only when the inevitable delay incident to 
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting United States v. Satterfieldf 743 F.2d 827, 844 
(1 lth Cir. 1984)), affd 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997). 
'"While "exigent circumstances" have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle 
is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at 
the time they acted.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1391 (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447, 370 
N.W.2d 166, 170 (Neb. 1985)); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (holding that "[t]he 
determination of exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances"). 
"Numerous cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances 
indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant 
could be obtained." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, 1259 n.10, (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999) (authorizing a police officer to break the 
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door or window of a building to arrest a person reasonably suspected of committing an\ 
public offense "where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed"). In 
Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a suspected drug dealer's house 
based on probable cause and exigent circumstances that contraband would be destroyed if 
the police did not act immediately and before a warrant could be obtained. Id. at 1258-59. 
The evidence in support of exigent circumstances in this case is even weightier than in Ashe. 
In Ashe, officers arrested at a parking lot two codefendants, suspected of being 
defendant's middlemen, after an undercover officer made a small, initial purchase of cocaine 
in what was intended to be a still larger drug deal. Ashe, IAS P.2d at 1257. Based on their 
surveillance and voluntary statements of the middleman, officers knew that the defendant's 
residence was only two to five minutes from the parking lot and that he expected his 
middlemen to "quickly" return to expedite another, larger, purchase. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 
1257. Consequently, the officers were concerned that the defendant would become 
suspicious and destroy the remaining cocaine when his accomplices did not return. Id. 
When officers arrived at Ashe's home, one of them saw Ashe look out an upstairs window 
and then move away. Id. After knocking and identifying themselves, and briefly waiting for 
a response, the officers kicked open the front door. Id. Upon entering the residence, the 
officers heard a toilet flush and saw two bags containing white residue in the wastebasket 
near the toilet. Id. The court found that the "urgency of the situation escalated" with each 
of the subsequent events and there was "no realistic opportunity to seek a search warrant 
before the exigencies of the matter made it necessary to enter the dwelling." Id. at 1259, 
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1260. The court added that the officers did not have to eliminate all innocent explanations 
for the behavior they observed, "so long as the explanation advanced by the . . . agents to 
support the search appealed] in all probability to be correct." Id. at 1261 (quoting US. v 
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972)) (first alteration in original). 
In this case, Detectives Anderson and Ita arrived at the motel room on a tip that 
defendant and Champneys were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 99:2-3). At the motel 
room door they knocked and identified themselves (R. 99:3-4). At the same time, Detective 
Anderson observed defendant attempt to hide what appeared to be a crack pipe (R. 99:4). 
Also, immediately after the detectives identified themselves, Detective Anderson observed 
defendant and Champneys "running in the room, putting stuff behind the bed and running 
to and from the bathroom" (R. 99:6). He saw the women go to the bathroom "at least three 
times" (R. 99:7). Defendant's hurried activity was particularly significant to Detective 
Anderson because, in his experience, suspects, especially in hotel rooms, will try to flush 
narcotics down the toilet to destroy them (R. 99:7). 
The foregoing record established probable cause and exigent circumstances for the 
detectives to enter the motel room without a warrant. See Aplt. Br. at Pt. LA. 1. As the trial 
court correctly concluded, there was reason for the detectives to believe that defendants were 
in the act of destroying controlled substances (R. 93; 99:26). Indeed, the detectives' sense 
of the exigency was, if anything, more reasonable than those of officers in Ashe. In Ashe, 
the defendant's apparent attempt to destroy incriminating evidence could only be reasonably 
assumed, Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1265, whereas in this case those attempts were actually observed. 
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In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN TENDERING HER GUILTY 
PLEA, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, WAS PROPERLY TAKEN 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to allow her to withdraw her 
guilty plea by failing to inform her of her constitutionally protected rights, as prov tded by 
rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. at 22-28. Not only does the claim 
lack merit, but this Court should not consider it because defendant invited any error. 
A. Defendant invited any error in the rule 11 colloquy. 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 by not 
informing defendant that by pleading guilty she was surrendering her right to a speedy trial 
and that her right of appeal was limited. Aplt. Br. at 22-28.l4 However, defendant invited 
this error by preparing a plea statement deficient and then tendering it to the trial court in 
support of her guilty plea. 
"'[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309,1f54, 
989 P.2d 1091 (quotingState v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996)). "The doctrine 
of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it 
on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. 
14
 Rule 11(e) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest 
or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found (3) the 
defendant knows of. . . the right to a speedy public trial before and impartial jury . . . and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited." 
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Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 
(Utah 1993). The purpose of this rule is to discourage a defendant in a criminal case from 
inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it is the record "as a form of appellate insurance 
against an adverse sentence." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989), habeas 
corpus denied by Parson v. Galetka, 57 F. Supp.2d 1151 (1999). See State v. Bradley, 2002 
UT App 548, f 39, 57 P.3d 1139 (finding invited error in failure to draft a limiting instruction 
expressly requested by the court and on which jury would undoubtedly have been instructed 
if presented). 
Additionally, even plain error will not result in a reversal where the defendant has led 
the trial court into error. For example, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) 
(citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utahl981)). Notwithstanding the duty to properly 
instruct the jury, the Utah Supreme Court found in State v. Anderson, that a defendant's 
failure to object to an elements instruction, "even when specifically queried by the court," 
constituted invited error. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (citing 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (declining to consider to "seemingly] ill-
advised" instruction as manifestly erroneous, where defendant's counsel consciously chose 
not to object and "affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong 
with the instruction")). In Perdue, this Court refused to consider correctness of an 
instruction submitted by counsel "because if there was error, it was invited by defendant, and 
where invited error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails" 
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Perdue, 813 P 2d at 1206 (emphasis added). Relying on Perdue, this Court has repeated!} 
refused to consider a plain error claim when the error was invited. Chane\, 1999 LT App 
309, at [^54, 989 P.2d 1091 (refusing to consider claim of manifest injustice on appeal after 
the defendant objected to correct jury instruction offered by court at tnal). 
"'Rule 11(e) squarely places on tnal courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional 
and rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v Dean, 
2002 UT App 323, [^5, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1209, 1312 (Utah 
1987)). Notwithstanding that duty, this Court should, as it has in cases involving invited 
error to jury instructions, decline to consider defendant's claim that the trial court omitted 
two rule 11 requirements from defendant's plea-taking. First, as set out below, the trial court 
strictly complied with rule 11. Aple. Br. at Pt. IIIB. But more importantly for this 
discussion, defendant invited any conceivable error by preparing the deficient plea statement 
and presenting it to the trial court, necessarily implying that it accurately set out those 
constitutional rights that defendant was surrendering in pleading guilty. 
At defendant's change-of-plea hearing, in the presence of defendant, Ms. Champneys, 
and their respective counsel, the trial court heard that both defendants were reserving their 
right to challenge the denial of their motion to suppress evidence by conditionally pleading 
guilty under State v. Very(R. 100:2).l5 To emphasize and make clear to both defendants the 
significance of their conditional plea, the trial court stated: "[So everybody is clear on that, 
,s
 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
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[it] means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1,4).16 Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's 
clarification: 'That's correct" (R. 100:4). Throughout the colloquy, which defendant now 
claims lacked reference to only the right to a "speedy" trial (rule 11(e)(3)) and notice that 
defendant's right of appeal was limited (rule 11 (e)(8)), the trial court repeatedly elicited from 
defendant that by pleading guilty she was voluntarily waiving those rights identified by the 
court (R. 100:5-11). See subdivision 11(e)(3) ("The court.. . may not accept the plea until 
the court has found . . . the defendant knows . . . that by entering the plea, [the foregoing] 
rights are waived.") 
After explaining the significance of defendant's conditional plea, the court turned its 
attention to defendant's plea statement and thereafter relied on it (R. 100:4; Statement of 
Defendant, R. 56-62, attached at Addendum F). See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 
(Utah App. 1998) (recognizing that strict compliance with rule 11 may be accomplished 
through a plea affidavit adequately incorporated into the record by evidence that the 
defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the document) (citing State v. Magaire, 830 
P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1992)). The statement stated: "I know that I have a right to a trial in 
open court by an impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading guilty" (R. 58). 
The statement omitted the word "speedy" from defendant's trial right. Although the court 
informed defendant that by pleading she was giving up her right to the trial before an 
impartial jury, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court neglected to include the 
word "speedy" in its colloquy (R. 100:7-9). 
16
 The transcript of the plea-taking (R. 100:1-16) is attached at Addendum E. 
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However, any deficiency in the plea-taking is attributable to defendant because the 
trial court so clearly relied on the sufficiency of her statement, whose adequacy defendant's 
counsel vouched for. At the outset, the court was informed by defendant's counsel that a 
change-of-plea statement had been prepared, that counsel had reviewed the statement w ith 
defendant, that defendant had plenty of time to review the statement, and that counsel 
believed defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4-5). The court queried defendant 
about the importance of the rights "contained in that document" that she would be giving up 
that by pleading guilty (R. 100:5). The court then elicited from defendant her understanding 
that if she gave up her right to the trial, scheduled for the following Monday, "that you give 
up an [sic] important and significant constitutional and statutory rights as outlined in the 
paper you both read" (R. 100:7). 
Moreover, defense counsel assured the court that the colloquy was complete. The 
court inquired: "Counsel, anything else either one of you would have me ask you client 
regarding rule 11 requirements?" (R. 100:12). Defendant's counsel answered, "I have 
nothing, Your Honor" (R. 100:12). The court signed the statement, asserting that it believed 
defendant understood her rights she was surrendering and that she had voluntarily entered 
her plea (R. 100:14-15). Finally, at the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea, defendant's counsel acknowledged that defendant had been notified at the plea-taking 
that her trial had seen set for the following Monday and agreed with the trial court that it 
"[c]an't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5). 
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It is evident that defendant's counsel presented an incomplete plea statement to the 
trial court and that the trial court relied on it. Furthermore, defense counsel assure the court 
at the time that the colloquy was sufficient. Based on well-established law, this Court should 
find that by her actions defendant affirmatively led the trial court into any error and it should 
decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim. 
B. The trial court strictly complied with the requirements of rule 11. 
As noted above, defendant claims that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 
11 by not informing defendant that by pleading guilty she was surrendering her right to a 
speedy trial and that her right of appeal was limited. Aplt. Br. at 22-28. Because the context 
in which defendant offered her plea makes clear that she understood the rights claimed 
omitted from the court's colloquy, the claim is meritless. 
In State v. Visser, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that the trial court failed 
to strictly comply with rule 11(e) when it omitted the term "speedy" in informing the 
defendant of his right to a speedy public trial. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ffl[l 3,17,22 P.3d 
1242. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty mid-trial, and one day after trial moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at ff 3-6. In rejecting the rule 11 claim, the court recited 
subdivision 11(e)(8), recognizing that "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not 
prevent a court from taking into account other record factors in making its finding." Id. at 
If 12.17 The court concluded that because Visser was in the middle of a trial and understood 
17
 Subdivision 11(e)(8) provides: "[The findings mandated by rule 11] may be 
based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement." 
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from the trial court that he had a right to continue \v ith trial at the time he pleaded guiltv an\ 
"recitation, either orally or by affidavit, that [he] had the 'right to a speedy trial/ \\ ould ha\ e 
communicated no more than his actual trial experience to that point " Id at ^ 14 The facts 
as to each of defendant's claims in this case are analogous to those in Visser 
Advisement that right of appeal is limited 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial judge also failed to inform [defendant] that her 
guilty plea limited her nght to appeal," under subdivision 11(e)(8), because it "failed, 
however, to determine whether [she] understood that by pleading guilty she was waiving her 
right to challenge all . nonjunsdictional issues on appeal," other than her nght to appeal 
the denial of her motion to suppress. Aplt. Br. at 25. The claim is mentless 
First, it would appear that the requirement under subdivision 11(e)(8), that "the 
defendant be advised that the nght of appeal is limited," applies only to conditional pleas and 
that defendant received precisely the notice required. When Gibbons issued in 1987, 
subdivision 11(e)(8) did not exist. See Gibbons, 740 P 2d at 1312, Utah R Cnm P 11 
(1993) amendment note (attached at Addendum K). In 1993, subdivision (e)(8) and (I), the 
latter providing for conditional pleas, were added to rule 11 18 Utah R Cnm P 11 (1993) 
amendment note. Thus, it appears clear that subdivision 1 l(e)(8)'s "limited nght of appeal" 
18
 Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure, provides. 
With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution , a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or 
no contest, reserving in the record the nght, on appeal from the judgment, to 
a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
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contemplates only the circumstance in which a defendant pleads conditionally guilt). 
Indeed, there is no other circumstance apart from a conditional plea in which subdivision 
11(e)(8) makes sense, especially in light of the express notice in subdivision (e)(3) already 
informing defendant that pleading guilty constitutes a waiver, i.e., nonappealability, of 
constitutional rights. 
Even if subdivision 11(e)(8) were not directed only to conditional pleas, defendant 
received complete information as to the limitations on her right to appeal. As set out in detail 
above, see Aple. Br. at Pt. IIIA, the trial court elicited from defendant's counsel, in 
defendant's presence, that a conditional plea under Sery meant that she could appeal the 
denial of her motion to suppress evidence, an option defendant has clearly exercised (R. 
100:4-5). Additionally, the trial court elicited from defendant, and defendant does not 
dispute, her understanding that by pleading guilty she was surrendering all constitutional and 
statutory rights other than the right to a "speedy" trial (R. 100:5-11). Moreover, defendant 
does not challenge that her plea statement was not adequately incorporated into the colloquy, 
or except for the omission of "speedy" trial, that the statement states fails to inform her that 
by pleading guilty she waives all stated constitutional and statutory rights or that it did not 
indicate that the plea was entered into under State v. Sery (Plea statement, R. 56-62). In fact, 
by filing a notice of appeal and having this Court accept her appeal from the denial of her 
motion to suppress, defendant received precisely the right she preserved by pleading guilt, 
which negates any claim that the plea colloquy was deficient. Cf. Visser, 2000 UT 88, at^ f 14 
(actual experience effectively communicated rule 11(3) right). In sum, apart from reference 
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to "speedy" trial, defendant was made abundantly aware of her right of appeal and its 
limitation. 
Speedy trial 
By her experience at the plea-taking, defendant was fully informed that she had a right 
to a speedy trial which she would be surrendering by pleading guilty. At the beginning of 
the plea-taking, in defendant's and her counsel's presence, the trial court noted that the case 
was set for trial the following Monday (R. 100:1-2). Thereafter, the court elicited from 
defendant that she understood that she would be giving important constitutional and statutory 
rights "if you give up your right to have a trial which is scheduled next Monday" (R. 100:7). 
Immediately afterward, the court emphasized that it wanted to make sure defendant was clear 
that "[I]f you plead guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that?" (R. 
100:7). Defendant answered affirmatively (R. 100:7). Six months later, at the hearing on 
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, defendant's counsel acknowledged that at the plea-
taking his client had been informed that trial was set for the following Monday, a setting 
which "[c]an't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5). On these facts, defendant's 
"experience communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the 'right 
to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88, atf l3. Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's rights were properly explained to her (R. 
182:5). Defendant's claim is frivolous. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
-rf 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %1 day of February, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
7
 KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered to Kent R. Hart and Patrick L. Anderson, Salt lake Legal Defender 
Association, attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this %7 day of February, 2003. 
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Addendum A 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures*] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
e
 w*' *?*in*t unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibil ity for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, ™™m«Hf 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct 
77*74, Arrest by pence officers. 
A pesos officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public oflbneo committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer, "pceeeneo* includes all of the physical senses or any device 
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has rsesonshle cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reesonahle cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, sad there ia reeeonshle cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himeelf to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
77*7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when. 
lb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases, 
a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which the 
person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing 
him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and 
explain the purpose for which admission is desired Demand and explanation 
need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or 
where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R u l e U 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001.) 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice 
of appeal. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.) 
Addendum B 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 19, 2001 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys, 
Case #011905093 and State of Utah vs. Liza Victoria Corwell, 
Case #011905094. Let the record reflect that the matter for 
hearing is the Defendant's Motion for - Motion to Suppress. 
Appearances please. 
MS. TAYLOR: Lana Taylor on behalf of the State. 
MR. ANDERSON: Patrick Anderson with Mrs. Corwell, 
Your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Dave Finlayson with Ms. Champneys. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, what I've received 
and reviewed is the motion of defendant Rebecca Champneys to 
suppress some supporting memoranda and I've read the State's 
response and I've received the preliminary hearing and I 
haven't read it in great detail, but I've read what I thought 
were the pertinent portions. So, with that, are we ready to 
proceed? 
MS* TAYLOR: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Call your first witness. 
MS. TAYLOR: The State would call Detective Troy 
Anderson. 
THE COURT: If you'll come forward and be sworn 
please, sir. 
1 
1 i TROY ANDERSON 
2 having been duly sworn testified upon 
3 his oath as follows: 
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
6 Q Detective Anderson, please state your full name and 
7 spell your last name for the record. 
8 A It's Troy Anderson, A-N-D-E-R-S-O-N. 
9 Q And where are you currently employed? 
10 A Salt Lake City Police Department in the Narcotics 
11 Division. 
12 Q And on March 13 of this year, did you have occasion 
13 to investigate a case at 1990 West North Temple? 
14 A I did. 
15 Q What led to your investigation? 
16 A We had received information that there were some 
17 individuals in the hotel room, I believe it was 236, for 
18 possibly using and/or selling narcotics. 
19 Q And where did that information come from? 
20 A I believe it was a telephonic, a phone call, that on 
21 of the detectives, Detective Etta I believe, had received. 
22 THE COURT: Say that again, sir. 
23 THE WITNESS: I believe it was a telephone call made 
24 to Detective Etta. 
25 THE COURT: Oh. All right, he was out there with you 
THE WITNESS: Correct. He was one of the detectives 
with me, that's correct. 
Q (BY MS. TAYLOR) And in that phone call, did the 
person making the call identify themselves? 
A I don't recall. I didn't take the phone call. I'm 
not sure. 
Q And was there any specific information about any 
particular individuals involved? 
A Yeah. I believe the name was Lisa, I think it was 
Crawell, Crowell. 
Q So based on that information, what did you do? 
A We responded to the Motel 6 and responded to that 
room number and we did what's called a knock and talk. 
Q Prior to that had you had any conversations with any 
of management of the Motel 6? 
A Before that, I don't believe we had. 
Q What did you do when you were at the room? 
A Detective Etta knocked on the door. I was with him. 
He knocked on the door. A female individual asked who it was. 
Q I'm sorry, I want to stop you. Did they open the 
door at that time? 
A No, they did not. 
Q What did the female say? 
A She asked who it was and Detective Etta's response 
was, it's Tracy. That's his first name. 
3 
1 , Q And was there any response when he said that? 
2 A I believe she asked, who? At which time he again said 
3 it's Tracy and then he responded that it was Tracy with the 
4 Salt Lake City Police Department. 
5 Q Then what happened? 
6 A While he was doing this I could see into the curtain 
7 and I could see a female at the door, the female that he was 
8 engaging in conversation. She asked at that point to see a 
9 badge. He showed his badge to her through a peep hole or an 
10 eye hole in the door. I could also see a gap between the 
11 curtain and the door and I could see the individual, so I 
12 showed by badge at which time I saw her lean down and look at 
13 my badge. 
14 Q And how much of a gap between the window curtain and 
15 the door was there at that time? 
16 A Probably six to twelve inches. 
17 Q What happened after you and Detective Etta displayed 
18 your badges? 
19 A At that point I could see quite a lot of movement in 
20 the room, I saw the individual known later to me as Lisa, put 
21 what I thought was a crack pipe into a purse. I could see the 
22 two individuals running around the room. They both went into 
23 the bathroom a couple of time each. I could see them putting 
24 stuff behind the bed, like under the bed on the, what would be 
25 like the north side of the bed. 
Q Let me go back. When was the first time that you saw 
the individual identified as Lisa? 
A While I was engaged with conversation, I believe her 
name is Rebecca at the door, I could see Lisa, who was later 
known to me as Lisa, another female behind her in the room. 
Q Did you or any of the other detectives have any 
conversation with Lisa at that time? 
A I know that I asked if there was anybody in the room 
and Rebecca stated that Lisa wasn't there and I saw the second 
female and if I recall correctly, she told me at that point, 
that that was Lisa. 
Q Who told you that was Lisa? 
A I believe it was Rebecca. 
Q And did you have any conversation with Lisa at that 
time? 
A No. 
Q Now, at what point - let me go back. When you first 
- the window was open, the six to twelve inches that you 
stated? 
A Right. 
Q When you first were talking to someone in the room 
and first displayed your badges, how many people could you see 
in the room? 
A Initially I could see one individual and then shortly 
thereafter I could see the second individual behind her. 
5 
1 Q And at what point, you say you saw some movement in 
2 I the room, at what point did that occur? 
3 A As we were talking to Rebecca, at one point, after 
4 we'd showed the badges and I had asked her to open the door, 
5 she had actually tried to close the curtain which had narrowed 
6 the gap that I could see in the opening, however, I could still 
7 see into the room and there was a mirror on the wall which 
8 would have been to my lefthand side and I could see into the 
9 room and see the reflection in the mirror that mirrored back 
10 into the room. At that point is when I could see the second 
11 individual who I believe is Lisa and Rebecca running in the 
12 room, putting the stuff behind the bed and running to and from 
13 the bathroom. 
14 Q At what point - you say you saw Lisa putting 
15 something into a purse? At what point did that occur in the 
16 course of this? 
17 A That was almost immediately after I had showed 
18 Rebecca my badge through the window. 
19 Q And what did it appear to be that she put in the bag? 
20 A I initially thought that it was a crack pipe. It was 
21 a metallic object that looked the size and shape of a crack 
22 pipe to me. 
23 Q So does that constitute, I guess the beginning of the 
24 movement that you mentioned in the room? 
25 A Yes. That was the first thing that I noticed. 
Q And after that point were both of the individuals in 
the room making the movements that you talked about? 
A Yes. I saw both individuals go to the bathroom at 
least three times. It was back and forth at least three times. 
Q And did they appear to have anything in their hands? 
A I couldn't see anything in their hands. 
Q Before they went into the bathroom did they appear to 
pick up anything or do anything with any objects? 
A Other than I initially saw the crack pipe and I again 
saw, I believe it was Lisa, putting the purse behind the bed or 
the bag and then they were going into the bathroom. 
Q And did all of this movement that you've talked 
about, did that indicate anything to you? 
A Yeah, it's been my experience that a lot of times, 
especially in hotel rooms, people will try to flush, especially 
narcotics, cocaine, or anything that can be flushed basically. 
Q All right. What happened after you saw this 
movement, all this stuff going on in the motel room through the 
crack in the drapes? 
A What happened next? 
Q Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A As this was happening, Detective Tracy had gone and 
spoke to the manager and what I was told was Detective Tracy 
was told by the manager or the employee at the time that if 
there was illegal drug use going on in the hotel room, that 
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they were to be kicked out. They didn't want them in there and 
he had given Detective Tracy a key* About that time Detective 
Tracy had returned back to the motel room and I told Rebecca 
that she needed to open the door* She refused to do that- We 
tried to use the key. The key didn't work because they had the 
deadbolt. It's actually not a deadbolt, it's like the flap 
over lock that's common in motel rooms. They had that engaged. 
I told her to open the door or we'd have to force it open. 
They again refused at which time the door was kicked. As the 
door was being kicked, someone screamed that they would open 
the door and essentially it was too late because Detective 
Tracy had kicked the door a second time and it had come open at 
that point. 
Q Did the officers then enter the room? 
A We did. 
Q And in that room did you find evidence that relates 
to this case? 
A We did. 
MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ANDERSON: 
Q It is detective, right? 
A Yes sir. 
8 
Q Detective Anderson, you said that you had Detective 
Etta had intelligence, correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q You didn't know if there was a specific name or if it 
was an anonymous source. You just knew that he had some 
intelligence. 
A I knew that he had the name of Lisa Crowell from that 
intelligence report but I don't know - I believe is was a non-
mis-complaint but I don't know from whom. 
Q When you got to the hotel, how long was it after you 
got to the hotel room you went up to the room an knocked on the 
door? 
A How long from the time we arrived at the hotel to the 
time we went to the room? 
Q Yes. 
A A few minutes. 
Q So you didn't stake the hotel out? 
A No. 
Q You didn't see anybody coming and going from the 
room? 
A No. 
Q You didn't talk to the manager about whether people 
had been coming and going from the room? 
A I did not. 
Q To your knowledge did anybody? 
9 
1 I A Not to my knowledge. 
2 Q Okay. So you didn't have any independent information 
3 that there was anything peculiar or unusual about this room 
4 when you arrived at the hotel? 
5 A I'm sorry? 
6 Q You didn't have any personal observations of anything 
7 unusual occurring at this hotel? 
8 A No. 
9 Q And you knock on the door and Officer Etta says, it's 
10 Tracy? 
11 A Correct. 
12 Q That's correct? Not, Salt Lake City Police, not 
13 detectives. He said, it's Tracy. 
14 A Initially that's correct. 
15 Q Initially. Then the person said who? He said, it's 
16 Tracy a second time? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q It was only after the third inquiry that he 
19 identified himself as a police officer? 
20 A I believe the second time he said, it's Tracy and the 
21 response was again who or something to that effect and he said 
22 with Salt Lake City Police Department, that's correct. 
23 Q Then you attempted to show your badges through the 
24 window? 
25 A I did show my badge through the window. He showed 
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his through the peep hole. 
Q Do you recall anybody from inside asking for a search 
warrant? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Were you in uniform? 
A We were not. 
Q And your badges you just held out or were they on 
your body or did you hole them out from a billfold type? 
A They were on a necklace with like a leather 
background. 
Q Okay. People can have fake badges. That's true, 
isn't it? 
A That's true. 
Q Okay. You said in your report, now you say a crack 
pipe today, but when you wrote your report you said that you 
observed Lisa place what appeared to be a metallic object in a 
black purse on the bed and then you said that the object looked 
to be the right shape and size of a crack pipe, correct? 
A Which part are you referring to in the report? 
Q The second paragraph right in the middle. 
A The object looked to me to be the right size and 
shape of a crack pipe. 
Q Okay, but you said it was a metallic object. So you 
weren't sure it was a crack pipe. You just said there was some 
object that was consistent with maybe the shape and size of it 
11 
1 but you weren't sure it was a crack pipe? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A I thought it was a crack pipe. 
Q But you said in your report, you said it was just a 
metallic object that could be a crack pipe? 
A I thought it was a crack pipe. 
Q When you searched the bag, what did it end up being? 
It was not a crack pipe, is that correct? 
A It was a spoon. 
Q When you saw they running around or moving around in 
the room, either Rebecca or Lisa, you didn't at any time see 
any drugs? 
A No. 
Q You didn't see any drugs on the coffee table or on 
the dresser? 
A Prior to entering? 
Q Prior to entering the room? 
A That's correct. 
Q You didn't see any drugs on the bed? 
A No. 
Q You didn't smell any drugs coming from the room? 
A No. 
MR. ANDERSON: I have no further questions, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Just a couple of questions if I can 
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Your Honor and I really do only have a couple of questions. We 
always say that and then go on ad nauseam. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FINLAYSON: 
Q You personally, this intelligence report, knew that 
there was somebody that may be involved in drug activity? 
A Say it again, I'm sorry. 
Q You testified that the intelligence report you 
understood there may be somebody there that's involved in drug 
activity? 
A As far as a name, you mean, yes. 
Q Well, just the information. There's Lisa, right, is 
the name? 
A Correct. 
Q But as far as the information simply that there may 
be somebody involved in drug activity there? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And that's it. That's as specific as the 
intelligence report was to you, right, personally? 
A That's all I recall, yes. 
Q Now, you personably didn't call to try to verify 
where that information was coming from or call back to a phone 
number? 
A I personally did not. 
MR. FINLAYSON: Okay. I think that's all I have, 
13 
1 Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, anything further from this 
3 witness? 
4 MS. TAYLOR: Just one question. 
5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
7 Q You stated that the item that you believed was a 
8 crack pipe turned out to be a spoon? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q Was that taken into evidence? 
11 A It was. 
12 Q And why is that? 
13 A Often times, spoons are used to cook or rock up the 
14 cocaine. 
15 Q And did this particular spoon have any indication o 
16 that? 
17 A I believe it had residue on it, yes. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Nothing further. 
19 THE COURT: Anything else? 
20 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. ANDERSON: 
22 Q You didn't observe any residue on this object, this 
23 spoon? 
24 A I believe it had residue on it. 
25 Q But when you're looking through the window and it's 
1 being put in the purse, you didn't see any residue or anything? 
A No, sir. 
Q She was probably about ten, fifteen feet from you? 
A Probably, yeah, five to ten feet. 
Q When she put it in the purse, was the purse behind 
her back or was her purse in between you and her? 
A She was actually profiled. The room I believe faces 
what would be north to south. The bed is in the room east to 
west. She was on the corner of the bed. The bag was on the 
bed and she was placing the item in the — 
Q Did you see where she picked up this spoon from? 
A I did not. 
MR. ANDERSON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson? 
MR. FINLAYSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor, no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor? 
MS. TAYLOR: Nothing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Detective, just one thing, maybe a 
couple. Is this a hotel, a motel? 
THE WITNESS: It's a Motel 6, sir. 
THE COURT: Oh. Okay. So I'm not familiar with the 
place. Tell me, you say it has windows in the side of the door 
or something? 
THE WITNESS: As I was standing looking at the motel 
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room, the door would be here and like a bay style window to the 
right of it. 
THE COURT: So it's kind of a typical motel room 
where you got a door and then a window next to it and then the 
next unit window? 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, when you looked in, you were 
looking directly into the room? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Now, this movement that you saw where 
people appeared to be putting things behind the bed and in the 
purses and moving back and forth to the bathrooms, did that 
occur before or after or during you identified yourself as 
police officers? 
THE WITNESS: That occurred after. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, counsel? 
MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. 
MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you sir. You may stand down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MS. TAYLOR: The State has no other evidence to 
present. 
THE COURT: Is that the extent of the State's 
evidence? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Defense going to offer 
any evidence? 
MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. 
MR. FINLAYSON: No Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Closing remarks? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, essentially what we're 
looking at here is that the issue before the Court is did the 
officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter 
the hotel room without a warrant and the information that the 
officers had ahead of time was that there was some drug 
activity going on in this particular room and that an 
individual by the name of Lisa or Lizza was involved in that. 
So the officers went to the room. They had every right to go 
there, knock on the door. They are in a place where they can 
see into this room. The drapes are open enough they can see in 
and they ask if Lisa's there. At first they're told no. Then 
later it comes out well, yes, in fact, this Lisa is in the room 
and so they're able to confirm that bit of their information. 
And then they also see what the officer believes is a woman 
putting a crack pipe into a purse, which confirms the other end 
of it, the drug activity. So, so far, they're hitting right 
with the information they have and I think it's very 
significant that after they identified themselves as police, 
the evidence of a pipe which is indicative of drug use, that 
that purse is hidden, that these individuals are rushing back 
1*7 
1 , to the bathroom, back and forth and they don't do any of this 
2 until the police offi cers identify who they are. The officers 
3 I ask to come in. They won't let them in and one of the officers 
4 I goes and gets the key from the manager because the manager 
5 wants them out. So they've used the key the manager's given 
6 them. They can't get in the room and so they eventually kick 
7 on the door and I think you've got probable cause and 
8 circumstances. 
9 For probably cause you look at all those facts and 
10 circumstances known to the officer, including - according to 
11 their knowledge and experience, what those things that they see 
12 indicate and whether or not they had a reasonable belief that 
13 an offense was being committed or had been committed. Well, 
14 from what the Officer saw, he believed that these women were at 
15 least in possession of drug paraphernalia or at least that one 
16 of the women in the room was. So I certainly think there's 
17 enough to show probably cause. 
18 With regard to the exigent circumstances, the Court 
19 is again suppose to look at the totality of the circumstances 
20 and whether or not the officers acted reasonable in what they 
21 did. Now the case law is very clear that the mere fact that 
22 drugs are the type of evidence that can be destroyed, that in 
23 and of itself, does not equal exigent circumstances. But in 
24 this case it goes much further than that. They see evidence of 
25 drug activity and then they see these individuals in the room 
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running back and forth to the bathroom which the officer 
testified in his experience is very common practice in motel 
rooms when people are destroying drugs and the fact that this 
occurs after the officers identify themselves, I think, 
indicates that there were exigent circumstances that the 
officers believed that the evidence was being destroyed, that 
these women took it back to the bathroom and because of that, 
think they had both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
which justify the entry into the room. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, as the Court is aware', in 
this type of situation, it's a private promise. There's a ver 
high burden on the State. They have to show both probably 
cause and exigent circumstances. In this case the probable 
cause, they may have had reasonable suspicion. They had an 
anonymous tip to go to a hotel room. They go to the hotel 
room. They observe no drugs. They observe a metallic object 
in the room. There's no smell or odor of drugs. They didn't 
have, I would argue, what would amount to a probable cause at 
that place and also, it's almost like the State vs. Beavers 
case in that the court in that case, the officer went into a 
room and said after he went into the room, he felt danger and 
fear for his safety, so he had brought the exigency into the 
case. Well, in this situation, I think the police, their 
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1 activity, they knocked on the door. They didn't identify 
2 themselves as police. I just keep going back and I don't know 
3 why, I just remember every time I read this file and think 
4 about this case, and I think you're of the generation that can 
5 recall this, reminds me of the land shark on Saturday Night 
6 Live, when it knocks on the door and it says candy gram. 
7 THE COURT: Actually I'm probably before Saturday 
8 Night Live. 
9 MR. ANDERSON: Oh, you are. Well, I was hoping you'd 
10 remember. 
11 THE COURT: But I'm certainly wiLling to be educated. 
12 Tell me about Saturday Night Live? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: Well, on Saturday Night Live there's a 
14 land shark that's going around and killing people in the 
15 neighborhood and it's all over the TV and so everybody that 
16 knocks on the door and it would say land shark and they would 
17 open the door and he would kill them. So bhen they started to 
18 get smart and so they wouldn't open the door and it would knock 
19 on the door and it would say like candy gram and they'd open 
20 the door and it would eat them. 
21 But I guess the reason I go back to that is they 
22 knock on the door and they say Tracy and they say it twice and 
23 then they identify themselves as police. They're non-uniform. 
24 They simply have a badge. I mean, I'm not sure that that 
25 really puts everybody in the room on notice that they really 
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1 are police officers. Why didn't they just identify themselves 
as police officers the first time and so therefore, add a 
little more credibility to the fact that they are police 
officers with authority and they're standing outside the door? 
They made a misrepresentation so I guess the story is more 
amusing to me than anyone else, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ANDERSON: But the key is that it's not enough if 
you have like a knock and talk, if there is just a reasonable 
suspicion. There has to be probable cause. Also, there has to 
be a genuine exigency and Beavers even uses language that the 
only risk that exists if an investigory stop is not effected is 
the risk that the investigation of "potential criminal activity 
might be delayed or at worst thwarted altogether." That's what 
these people were looking at was potential criminal activity. 
They had anonymous, non-specific source whom they have never 
identified because they can't. They did not have any 
independent observations of any illegal activity and they 
simply had people scurrying around the room. They see no 
drugs. He sees what he says is consistent with what he thinks 
is the shape and size of a crack pipe. All it is, is a spoon. 
I'd say Your Honor, that that just is not enough to give them 
probably cause and that there was not enough of an exigency to 
go into the room. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
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1 . Mr. Finlayson, anything you want to add to that? 
2 MR. FINLAYSON: There's not much that I can add to 
3 I that, Your Honor. I think the cases that we provided to Your 
4 Honor, (inaudible) vs. JL, talk about anonymous tips. There 
5 certainly was not enough here to even corroborate - there 
6 wasn't enough information here that they could have 
7 corroborated much, there maybe drug activity and a person named 
8 Lisa. It's clear under that case, that that's not enough to 
9 provide a probable cause and they just simply didn't see 
10 J anything when they did get there. 
11 The only thing they did see was might be a crack pipe 
12 which turned out not to be a crack pipe so obviously, the 
13 detective wasn't sure it was a crack pipe. Even probably cause 
14 of a crack pipe doesn't give you the right to go into the hotel 
15 room. You still have to have exigent circumstances and under 
16 the case law, that's such a minor offense, it probably doesn't, 
17 you probably can't even use exigent circumstances. 
18 But what they do see is a lot of moving around which 
19 also could be consistent with cleaning up the apartment. They 
20 don't hear the toilet flushing. The don't see anything in the 
21 person's hands going in and out of the bathroom. They see them 
22 putting stuff behind the bed, under the bed, in a purse on the 
23 bed consistent with also cleaning up the room. What they have 
24 is a hunch and which we know from all the case law, is not 
25 enough and it just doesn't quite make it. Even with the Yodder 
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case, you know, there's so much in the Yodder case. There was 
a little girl who, they found her clothing. She's missing. 
They know there's criminal activity afoot. They don't even 
know there's any criminal activity afoot here. They don't even 
have probable cause. That probable cause may be the person 
named Lisa is there. But, you know, Yodder was a recent case, 
a fairly recent case that really was a totality of the 
circumstances case. It was a very close case but there was 
just so much going on. This guy's on his balcony and says he's 
not on his balcony. He tells the cops he was asleep when they 
know he was on his balcony. The clothes are found nearest his 
balcony and all of this, you know, all of this information, 
when you've got what you know is criminal activity afoot, a 
little girl that's missing and her clothes were found, a very, 
more, almost more of an emergency doctrine case and this isn't 
even close and so I just don't think they make it. 
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the totality, the officers 
had information that drug activity was going on in the room, 
they have information that a person named Lisa is in the room. 
They go to the room. People lie to them and say no, Lisa's not 
here. Then they find out that Lisa is there. They see what 
appears to be paraphernalia and what in the end turns out to be 
paraphernalia and they see - I think all those things go to 
probably cause. I think that creates probable cause that 
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1 i information that drug activity is going on, they see things 
2 that confirm that, probable cause that there's drug activity in 
3 that room and the exigent circumstances are created when these 
4 individuals in the room start hiding things. Hiding things in 
5 purses, hiding purses behind beds, running back to the 
6 bathroom. In their experience as narcotics officers, that is 
7 very consistent with things they've seen in the past destroying 
8 evidence. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
10 Submit the matter? 
11 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
12 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I think I'm ready to rule on this one. 
14 Like most of these matters, what happens in the information, 
15 whether it's corroborated or it comes from an anonymous source, 
16 builds as the time goes along. So that's why I'm required to 
17 look at the totality of the circumstances. 
18 Here we have an anonymous tip that there's drug 
19 dealing going on in this room where apparently the defendant, 
20 I'll get everybody's name right here - Lisa Corwell is in the 
21 room. That certainly gives the officers the right to go over 
22 and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want 
23 to talk to them and they did that and they also confirmed, 
24 which gives support to the anonymous tip, is that Liza Corwell, 
25 I ultimately, she was in the room and so therefore, we haven't 
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haven't just got somebody making a phone call. We've got 
somebody making a phone call with some information that appears 
to be at least as far as that's concerned, correct. 
Had the officers not been able to see into the room 
then of course they would not have had the right to enter the 
room. They couldn't have got a warrant. But what they saw was 
evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was evidence of 
the commission of a crime. It turned out he was wrong as to 
this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when he thought it was 
a crack pipe but I don't find anything inherently unreasonable 
about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even 
though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong, is not 
important. It's what he reasonably thought it was at the time. 
That would be like saying, Well, they didn't know there were 
drugs but they found them, therefore, it's okay. We don't 
accept that either. So, it's not the product of the search 
that's important or what's actually found, but what is 
reasonably in the minds of the person at the time and I'm 
satisfied that Officer Anderson, by what he saw, thought that 
he observed a drug paraphernalia. 
Then, when I add to that the fact that when they 
identified them as police officers, identified themselves as 
police officers, the activity starts in the room that is 
consistent, may be consistent with cleaning up the room but 
that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under the 
2^  
1 circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of 
controlled substances. The officer testified that in his 
opinion, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to know that, 
because controlled substances are disposable by flushing them 
down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things 
about, going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause 
to enter the room and it also, because of the nature of the 
conduct, provides the sufficient exigent circumstances to kick 
in the door. 
If the exigent circumstances weren't there, they 
would have had to get a warrant. I'm satisfied there was 
enough to get a warrant based on what was expressed to that 
point in time and what was observed. The exigent circumstances 
give them the right to kick in the door when it's bolted even 
though they - have the key makes no difference. Who gave them 
the key makes no difference, but not being able to get in even 
with the key, they had the right to kick down the door because 
I think it's reasonable to believe that they thought that there 
were controlled substances being destroyed. And so, therefore, 
the motion is denied. There's probable cause and I believe 
there's exigent circumstances. So let's set the matter for 
trial. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, would you like the State to 
prepare findings, conclusions in an order? 
THE COURT: Please. 
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Is there some reason we ought to be trying these 
cases separately? 
MS. TAYLOR: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
MR. ANDERSON: I think they just started off on 
different tracks because they were arrested at different times 
or something. 
THE COURT: For some reason and it's never been 
satisfactorily explained to me, every defendant gets charged 
with and is placed in a different file with a different number 
even though it may be the same information and I don't 
understand why that administratively has to happen but it's 
foolish because you get cases that should be together that 
appear on the surface to be separated and they might go to 
different judges. But anyway, the long and the short of it is 
these cases ought to be together unless there's some legitimate 
reason not to try them together and I would certainly entertain 
that. So, here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to order 
these cases be consolidated. They come out of the same event, 
they came out of the same alleged criminal episode and at least 
at this point in time, it doesn't appear to be an prejudice to 
either one of the defendants by combining these cases. That 
doesn't mean I will not entertain a motion to separate these 
cases on reflection if counsel thinks that's necessary. 
So, would you get my calendar please? 
Two-day trial I assume. 
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1 MR. ANDERSON: Yeah- No more than that. 
2 THE COURT: Anybody in a big hurry to try this? 
3 MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Well, how about the 26th of November? 
5 Let's go to the 28th and the 29th. 
6 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, I have a trial the 26th, 
7 27th and 28th with Judge Lewis that I'm pretty confident is 
8 going to go. 
9 THE COURT: How about the 5th of December? 
10 MR. FINLAYSON: I have a jury trial then with Judge 
11 Skanchy. I'm not sure if that one is going or not but I do 
12 have one set for the 5th and the 6th. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 10th of December? 
14 MR. FINLAYSON: That would be fine. 
15 MR. ANDERSON: That's fine. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, this is your case? 
17 MS. TAYLOR: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
18 THE COURT: All right. 10th of December, two days, 
19 10th and 11th, We start at ten o'clock with a jury. We'll 
20 need counsel here at 9:30. Instructions first morning of 
21 trial. Final pretrial on December 7, nine o'clock on my 
22 regular criminal motion calendar. If there's a resolution, 
23 I'll consider it then and if there's any special voir dire that 
24 I need to concern myself with, I'll expect to have that also b^ 
25 the 7th. If there is a resolution between the parties before 
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1 that date, I have no objection to your calling my clerk and 
2 having her put it on the calendar on an earlier Friday. 
3 Otherwise I'll see you on the 7th. 
4 MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you counsel. We'll be in recess 
6 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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DAVID E YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-v -
Case No 011905094 
LIZA CORWELL, 
Hon Timothy R Hanson 
Defendant 
This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on September 19, 2001, 
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding 
The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana Taylor The Defendant was 
present and represented by Patrick L Anderson Evidence was presented in the form of 
testimony from Detective Troy Anderson The Court, based upon the evidence and 
argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by counsel, and 
for good cause shown, makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 On March 13, 2001, Salt Lake City Detective Troy Anderson and other 
officers investigated a report that Defendant Corwell was involved in using or selling 
illegal drugs in a motel room, located at 1990 West North Temple, in Salt Lake County 
or: ?: J 
1 
2. The officers knocked on the door of the motel room and asked if 
defendant Corwell was present. 
3. Defendant Champneys spoke to the officers through the door and said that 
Corwell was not there. 
4. Detective Anderson could see into the room through the window and saw 
both Defendants Champneys and Corwell. 
5. Defendant Corwell then told the officers that she was in the room. 
6. The officers identified themselves and asked if they could enter the room 
7. Through the window, Detective Anderson saw Defendant Corwell put 
what appeared to be a black crack pipe into a purse, which was on the bed. Corwell then 
put the purse behind the bed. Both defendants were running around the room, putting 
items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom. 
8. The officers asked the defendants to open the door, and the defendants 
refused. 
9. The officer told the defendants that if they did not open the door, they 
would have to force the door open and the defendants again refused to open the door 
10. One of the officers received a key to the room from the manager of the 
motel, who said that he wanted the defendants "kicked out." 
11. The officers tried to use the key to enter the room, but the door was dead-
bolted. 
12. The officers kicked the door in and arrested the defendants for interfering 
with a police investigation. 
2 
13 Defendants Champneys and Corwell were searched and officers found the 
evidence m this case, which consisted of cocaine and drug paraphernalia 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The officers had probable cause to believe that drug activity was occurring 
in the room as a result of the information they were provided and the facts, which 
confirmed that information 
2 The officers had exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into 
the motel room as a result of the defendants' actions, which indicated that they were 
concealing and destroying evidence 
3. The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the probable 
cause and exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment 
DATED this 
ApfTr^ ved as to Form 
Patrick L Anderson 
Attorney for the Defendant 
ly of 2001 
BY ykE COURT 
ISTRICT JUDGE 
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DAVID E YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v -
LIZA CORWELL, 
Defendant 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No 011905094 
Hon Timothy R Hanson 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is 
denied 
DATED this day of. 
Approved as to Form 
BY THE COURT 
ISTRICT JUDGE 
Patrick L Anderson 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Addendum D 
STATE OF UTAH V. REBECCA CHAMPNEYS 
Charge: Tampering with Evidence 2° 
Case No. 011905093FS 
Preliminary Hearing Date: June 19,2001 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
Attorney for Plaintiff (ATP): Lana Taylor 
Attorney for Defendant (ATD): David Finlayson 
1 J: Mr. Finlayson, do you have a copy of the information? 
2 ATD: I do Your honor. We would waive reading of that. 
3 J: The State call it's witness please. 
4 ATP: The State would call Detective Troy Anderson to the stand. 
5 J: Come forward please. 
6 Clerk: Raise your right hand please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
7 give in this case now before the Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
8 truth, so help you God? 
9 W: I do. 
10 Clerk: Sit here please. 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON 
12 ATP: Please state your full name and spell your last name for the record. 
13 W: It's Troy Anderson. A-N-D-E-R-S-O-N. 
14 ATP: Where are you currently employed? 
15 W: Salt Lake City Police Department in Narcotics Division. 
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001 
Tampering with Witness 2° 1 Case No. 011905093FS 
1 ATP: And were you so employed in March of this year? 
2 W: I was. 
3 ATP: Did you have occasion to go to the address of 1990 North Temple. I guess it was Motel 6 
4 on March 13th of 2000? 
5 W: I did. 
6 ATP: Is that within Salt Lake City? 
7 W: It is. 
8 ATP: And why were you there? 
9 W: We had an (inaudible) that the occupants of the room there were engaging in illegal use 
10 selling of narcotics. 
11 ATP: Did you have any other individuals - officers with you? 
12 W: I did. 
13 ATP: How many? 
14 W: I believe there were four or five of us. 
15 ATP: And what did you do at the Motel 6? 
16 W: We had information that the occupants we were looking for are Lisa and Rebecca were in 
17 room 236. We went to that room number and conducted a knock and talk. 
18 ATP: Can you please describe what you did that the door? 
19 W: Yeah. My self and Detective Ita went to the room, knocked on the door. A female asked who 
20 it was. Detective Ita said it was Tracy. The female asked who. Again, he said it was Tracy 
21 and then he said that it was Detective Ita with Salt Lake City Police Department. She asked 
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001 
Tampering with Witness 2° 2 Case No. 011905093FS 
1 us to see a badge. I could see her through a window - a crack in the - between the curtains 
2 and the window, I could see into the window. She asked to see a badge. Detective Ita held 
3 his badge up to the door. I held my badge up to the window. I could see her look at my 
4 badge. 
5 ATP: What happened next? 
6 W: We told her why we were there. 
7 J: Told who? Who's "her?" 
8 W: I'm sorry. The individual at the door. Later known to me as Rebecca. 
9 ATP: And is that individual present here in the room? 
0 W: She is. She's the individual sitting here. 
1 ATP: Thank you. The State would ask that the record reflect identification. 
2 J: It will. 
3 ATP: I believe you stated that the officers identified themselves and their purpose. Was that - at 
4 that time, were you speaking with the defendant? 
5 W: I was. 
5 ATP: And what was her response? 
7 W: I could see - as I'm looking into the window, I could see -1 asked her if -1 told her we were 
3 looking for an individual named Liza. She told me that Liza wasn't there and that she was 
? alone. At that point, I could see another female individual in the hotel room. And I saw her 
) at that point, put something into a black bag - a purse-type bag. At the time, I thought it was 
I a - what appeared to me to be a crack pipe or a pipe to smoke narcotics. 
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001 
Tampering with Witness 2° 3 Case No. 011905093FS 
1 ATP: What did you do after you saw that? 
2 W: At that point, I told Detective James Tracy what I'd seen. He told me that he'd go down to 
3 talk to the management to see if he could get a key to the hotel room. I continued to talk to 
4 Rebecca and told her that I could see that they were hiding what I thought was evidence and 
5 I told her to open the door. She refused. 
6 ATP: At that time, did you see any other activity at which caused you concern? 
7 W: Yeah. At that point, both individuals were running around the room. They were -1 could 
8 see them going under the bed - or behind and sort of under the bed. There's two beds in the -
9 I can't remember -1 think it was one big bed, but they were going to the far side of the bed 
10 underneath the bed. They were going in and out of the bathroom. They went in and out of 
11 the bathroom probably two or three times each. 
12 ATP: Did Detective Tracy get a key to the room? 
13 W: He did. He returned and told me that hotel management had given him a key and had told 
14 him that if there was anything illegal going on in the room that they were evicted. That they 
15 were no longer welcome at the hotel/motel. 
16 ATP: And did the key work? 
17 W: It worked, but the door wouldn't open. They had the deadbolt locked. 
18 ATP: And were you able to gain access to the room? 
19 W: Yes. I told Rebecca to open the door. She again refused. At that point, Detective James 
20 Tracy kicked the door. One of the occupants yelled that they would open it about halfway 
21 through James second kick which breached the door and the door opened. 
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1 ATP: What did you see when you went in the room? 
2 W: I saw the defendant Rebecca and I immediately engaged her; I placed her in a twist lock and 
3 put - they're called flex cuffs or like a plastic - they look like a zip tie-type handcuff on her. 
4 ATP: Was she under arrest at that time? 
5 W: She was. 
6 ATP: What for? 
7 W: Interfering. 
8 ATP: What did you do next? 
9 W: At that point, the other detectives maintained custody or gained custody or control of the 
0 other individual. I started to search the defendant Rebecca. 
1 ATP: Did you find anything? 
2 W: I did. In her rear pocket on the right side, I found a metallic pipe, what appeared to me to be 
3 a pipe or cocaine or crack pipe. It was burned on one end. It had a screen on the other end. 
4 I asked her what it was and she told me that it was a pipe that she used to smoke cocaine. 
5 ATP: And did you search her any further? 
6 W: At that point, she became extremely hostile. She was screaming that she wanted a female 
7 officer to search her. I told her that that wasn't possible, that I knew how to search an 
8 individual and to just let me do my job. Shortly thereafter, I mean, within seconds, I was 
9 told by - I'm not sure which detective, but I was told that we did have a female officer that 
0 was available and was in route. So at that time, I stopped searching the individual. 
1 ATP: Did the female officer search the defendant? 
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1 W: She did. Officer Patty Roberts arrived and searched both individuals. 
2 ATP: And prior to that, did the defendant make any statements about any further search? 
3 W: Yeah, she told me that - at that point, that she had cocaine on her. 
4 ATP: Did she say where? 
5 W: I don't recall. 
6 ATP: What did Officer Roberts find when she searched - what did she find when she searched the 
7 defendant? 
8 W: She found several items. I believe she found two items in her bra. One was a twist or a 
9 baggie of cocaine, which was tested and tested positive for cocaine. That's field tested. She 
10 also found a contact case and I believe it had some cotton - some like old cotton inside ofnt. 
11 She also found I believe, in the individuals pants a spoon with residue on it - white residue. 
12 She also found I think, some kleenex and like a brillo -1 think a burnt brillo pad of some sort 
13 in her pants as well. 
14 ATP: And the cocaine in the contact case. Where were those found? 
15 W: Those were in her bra I believe. 
16 ATP: And you stated those were - that substance was field-tested? 
17 W: I believe. It was field-tested at the time and it tested positive. I believe it was sent to the lab 
18 as well. 
19 ATP: I'm going to have marked State's Exhibit #1. I ask that you take a look at that. Do you 
20 recognize what that is? 
21 W: Yeah. 
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ATD: We'll stipulate to it. It's just the tox report. 
W: Tox report, yeah. 
J: Okay, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 - the tox report will be received. 
ATP: And was the substance which was found on the defendant, did that test positive for cocaine 
at the lab? 
W: Yes, it looks like it did. 
ATP: What occurred after Officer Roberts found the items? 
W: She searched the individuals inside the bathroom and I could hear -1 could hear a commotion 
when she searched the defendant. I asked if she was alright. She said yes. The two came 
out of the bathroom shortly thereafter. The bathroom - they were in the bathroom with the 
door closed, so I could hear what was happening but couldn't see what was happening. 
When they came out, I asked Officer Roberts what had happened. She told me that the 
individual had attempted to flush the cocaine. 
ATP: Do you - did you have anymore specifics about how the defendant attempted to do that? 
W: I believe what occurred is she had - as Officer Roberts had found the evidence, she had set 
it on the bathroom counter that was in the room. At some point, as Officer Roberts was 
continuing to search, the defendant had grabbed the cocaine off of the counter. (Inaudible). 
ATP: (Inaudible). 
W: I'm sorry. 
ATP: I'm sorry. Finish your.... 
W: Where a struggle had - somewhat of a struggle had ensued and Rebecca had the cocaine in 
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1 her hand. 
2 ATP: Did Deputy Roberts ever ask the defendant about the twist being missing? 
3 W: If I could refer to her report? 
4 ATP: Would that help you refresh your recollection? 
5 W: It would. 
6 ATP: Please. 
7 W: It says in her report that she asked what happened to the twist and that Becky stated that she 
8 thought it'd fallen down the bathroom drain. 
9 ATP: And was that twist ever recovered? 
10 W: It was. Officer Roberts found it in Becky's hand. 
11 ATP: I have no further questions. 
12 CROSS EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON 
13 ATD: I got a couple questions about this tox report. This tox report has Tl and T2 on it. And I 
14 don't know - can you tell me - it's got both defendant's on here. Rebecca Champneys and 
15 Liza Victoria Corwell - are both suspects? How do we know whichi one goes to who or what 
16 these were? 
17 W: I don't know. 
18 ATD: Okay. 
19 W: I know that... 
20 ATD: So you know that some of the stuff was recovered from both people, right? 
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1 W: Correct. 
2 ATD: Alright. But we don't know from this who Tl or T2 goes to? 
3 W: I don't. 
4 ATD: Do you know all the stuff that recovered from both? Or did some - did some officers recover 
5 stuff from Liza, some officers recovered stuff from Rebecca? 
6 W: I believe Officer - well, I know Officer Roberts - Patty Roberts searched both females. 
7 ATD: Searched both? Did you see her search? 
8 W: No, I was in the room, but she was in the bathroom with the door closed. 
9 ATD: Okay, so you don't have any personal knowledge of this search? 
0 W: That's correct. 
1 ATD: You were just told that there was things found on them? 
L2 W: That's correct. 
3 ATD: You didn't bag this stuff or take it to the evidence room or anything like that? 
14 W: I don't believe I took care of the evidence, no. 
15 ATD: Okay. Alright, let me ask you a couple questions. I actually just have a couple quick 
16 questions. You said that there was some information you were looking for Liza? 
17 W: Yes. 
i 8 ATD: And why were you looking for Liza? 
19 W: The intelligence report that Detective Ita had received was that a female named Liza and I 
10 believe he had her last name as well, but I don't know for certain was with another individual 
11 at the Motel 6 in that motel room and that they were engaging in illegal activity - either using 
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1 or selling narcotics. 
2 ATD: Either using or selling narcotics? But you didn't have any specifics? 
3 W: I'm not sure I understand your question. 
4 ATD: That's all you had? That these two people were either using or selling narcotic? 
5 W: Yeah, that a female named Liza is with another female in that room, yes. 
6 ATD: Did you know who that came from? 
7 W: I do. 
8 ATD: Did you know at the time? 
9 W: Yes. 
10 ATD: Okay, who did that come from? 
11 W: It came from -1 believe it was Liza's husband. 
12 ATD: Liza's husband? So Liza's husband calls and says Liza and some other female are using or 
13 selling narcotics? 
14 W: He' d been talking to her on the phone. 
15 ATD: Okay, now you didn't get a warrant? 
16 W: No. 
17 ATD: You go down there and then you have this intelligence report. Is that on the report form or 
18 does it just come in from dispatch or what? 
19 W: Usually it's a telephonic report. An individual that volunteered or whoever answers the 
20 phone documents everything, handwritten reports like this. 
21 ATD: So somebody just calls up and says "I'm Liza's husband." Is that.... 
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1 W: I didn't take the call, so I don't know. 
2 ATD: But that person wasn't - you didn't know that person's down at the police station swearing 
3 out a statement or anything. 
4 W: Ask the question again. I'm sorry. 
5 ATD: You don't know whether the person's down at the police station. You don't know whether 
6 the person called in. You just get some information telephonically that this information is 
7 out there? 
8 W: That's correct. 
9 ATD: Okay. So you're going over there to follow up on it? 
0 W: That's correct. 
1 ATD: And when you say a "knock and talk" in your report, you don't have a warrant, right? 
2 W: That's right. 
3 ATD: You're just going to knock on the door and talk to these people? 
4 W: That's correct. 
5 ATD: Now, you wrote in the report and you said - you got your report there? 
6 W: I do. 
7 ATD: You say, "I saw Liza place what appeared to be a metallic object into a black purse that was 
8 on the bed," right? 
9 W: Yes. 
0 ATD: Then the object looked to be the right shape and size of a crack pipe? 
1 W: That's correct. 
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1 ATD: You couldn't tell it was a crack pipe? It just looked the right size and shape? 
2 W: It looked like - yeah, it looked like a crack pipe to me. 
3 ATD: Metallic object. You were looking through the crack of the window? 
4 W: I'm looking through the window with the drapes open. Probably a three to four inch gap in 
5 the window. 
6 ATD: And was it dark? Light? 
7 W: Light. 
8 ATD: Light outside? I can't remember what time this is. 
9 W: I don't remember what outside looked like. I know the motel room was well lit. 
10 ATD: But is it dark or light outside? 
11 W: I don't recall. 
12 ATD: Are you inside a motel? Or are you - actually outside? Are you inside of a hotel area or are 
13 you actually outside in the air? 
14 W: We're outside in the air. 
15 ATD: Okay. But you don't put in your report it looks like a crack pipe? You say it looks like the 
16 right shape and size of a crack pipe, right? 
17 W: Yeah. It's what I believed to be a crack pipe? 
18 ATD: And how far away is Liza when you see this? 
19 W: Five to ten feet 
20 ATD: How big? At least your finger? Your index finger? How big is the object? 
21 W: Bigger than my finger. 
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1 ATD: Okay. Now then you bust in, right? You guys bust in when you tell these guys what's going 
2 on? You go to get the key, right? The key doesn't work and the key doesn't open it because 
3 the bolts locked, right? 
4 W: Correct. 
5 ATD: And so you kick the door in? 
6 W: Correct. 
7 ATD: You said they're going back and forth in the bathroom? 
8 W: Yes. 
9 ATD: Did you ever find out what they're doing in the bathroom? 
0 W: No. 
1 ATD: That's all the questions I have, Your honor. 
2 J: Any others? 
3 ATP: Just a couple things. 
$ REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON 
5 ATP: In your review of the report, how many - how many packages of controlled substance were 
6 found in the entire event? 
7 W: How many packages of controlled substance? 
8 ATP: Um hmm (affirmative). 
9 W: I believe there was two. 
0 ATP: And was one item found on each individual? 
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1 W: To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
2 ATP: Alright, so the information in the toxicology report also reflects that there were two items, 
3 isn't that right? 
4 ATD: Judge, I'm going to object to that and ask that it be stricken. I think he's already testified 
5 that he didn't observe the search and he doesn't actually know. And I don't know if we have 
6 another officer here, but he didn't observe the search, so he doesn't know what was taken or 
7 how many. I think that's what he just testified to. 
8 J: He said he wasn't present (inaudible). 
9 ATP: And Your honor, Rule 1102 allows this officer to testify from the reports of other officers -
10 his fellow officers and I think that's information that he's presented that he reviewed her 
11 report and according to the report, that she was searched and she found the substance in her 
12 bra. 
13 J: Counsel? Something else? 
14 ATD: I think it allows them to testify to whether or not the officer observed and told them. I think 
15 she's right about that. I'd object as Hearsay, but I understand that the rulings of the Court's 
16 have made. But if that's -1 guess my objection's on foundation. If that's - if that's what he's 
17 testifying to, then I'd object on foundation. I need a little more - I'd need to know where, 
18 what he's talking about or what specifically she said to him. 
19 J: Okay, well let's limit to that first. What did this officer tell you - the other officer, Roberts 
20 about what she found on Ms. Champneys and what she found on the other person was 
21 Corwell. 
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W: Again, on Rebecca, she told me that she found in her bra, she found a twist of what she 
thought was cocaine which was field-tested as cocaine. She found a contact case that was 
missing one of the two lids. Inside the other closed portion, was a dried up tissue. She found 
in her pants a spoon... 
J: And "her" meaning...? 
W: In Rebecca's pants she found a spoon, a brillo pad with I believe it had burn marks on it. 
And some more tissue. On Liza's person, she found I believe another rock I think, of 
cocaine. And she also found some paraphernalia and I'm not -1 could refer to the report. 
I'm not sure specifically what was - what the paraphernalia on her was. 
ATP: Does that lay specific foundation? 
J: Well, I don't know. Ask the next question. We'll see if there's an objection. 
ATP: To your knowledge, either from what the other officers have told you, or from your review 
of the report made in this matter by yourself and your fellow officers, to your knowledge, is 
there - were there any other items of actual controlled substance that were located other than 
the twist that you've mentioned that was found on the defendant and the twist that was found 
on Liza? 
W: No. 
ATP: And to your knowledge from your review of the reports and talking to your fellow officers, 
were both of those two items sent to the State Lab? 
W: I believe they were. 
ATP: And in your view of the reports as well as looking as State's Exhibit #1, do those appear t 
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001 
Tampering with Witness 2° 15 Case No. 011905093FS 
1 be the two items of controlled substances that were found on Rebecca and on Liza? 
2 W: Yes, T1 appears to be a white powdery - or a white powder and T2 appears to be white rock. 
3 ATP: I have no further questions. 
4 ATD: I don't have any other questions, Your honor. 
5 J: Okay, you can (inaudible). 
6 W: Thank you, Your honor. 
7 J: The State rests? 
8 ATP: Yes, your honor. 
9 J: Ms. Champneys, is she going to testify or call witnesses todays 
10 ATD: Your honor, I would advise her - we don't have any witnesses. I'd advise her to reserve Ifer 
11 right to testify at trial and I think she'll follow my advice. She shakes her head yes. 
12 J: She does. Thank you. Did either of you have anything else to say at this point? 
13 CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
14 ATD: I just have a brief argument, Your honor. I'm not sure that I know exactly what the State's 
15 theory is on the tampering with evidence, but I don't think that it's made out by -1 don't 
16 have any arguments on Count II and III, but on the tampering with evidence I don't think it's 
17 made out by hiding it on yourself. I don't think that can be altered or destroyed concealing 
18 or moving to impair severity or availability there. They're in there, they're coming in and 
19 they've got him there, so I don't think concealing on your own person meets that 
20 requirement. I don't think there was testimony that they verified anything was flushed down 
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1 the toilet, which is what I thought the theory was but I don't think there's been testimony to 
2 that. 
3 J: What about this part. I agree with you certainly as to initially the concealment in the - the 
4 alleged concealment by Ms. Champneys, but what about - as I gathered, there was this 
5 officer that searched Ms. Champneys, took the twist of cocaine and set it on the counter in 
6 the bathroom. Then Ms. Champneys took it. That was what I thought the officer said, 
7 anyway. There was a struggle for it and then the officer asked Ms. Champneys "what did 
8 you do with it?" or "where is it?" something to that effect. Ms. Champneys said, "Well, I 
9 think it fell down the sink." But later it was discovered in her hand. If that was the evidence, 
0 would that constitute the concealment in your judgment? 
1 ATD: Well, I suppose that -1 mean, I don't remember exactly how the testimony went. There was 
2 a struggle and she thought it went down the sink, but didn't turn out to have gone down the 
3 sink. I don't know that that shows intent to conceal. It shows she thought it might have gone 
4 somewhere and it didn't. It didn't say - the testimony wasn't that she said, "I tried to throw 
5 it down the sink," or "I tried to get rid of it," or "sorry I threw it down the sink I think it went 
6 down the sink," and setting it on the counter certainly isn't concealing. I just don't think it -
7 I mean, I know it doesn't take much to get it past prelim, but I don't think that there's 
8 anything specifically that goes to her intent to conceal it for that purpose. 
9 J: Okay. Did you want to say anything counsel? 
0 ATP: Yes, Your honor. As I recall the testimony, the officer laid the item on the sink as she 
1 continued to search then the items no longer were on the sink or on the basin, she asked Ms. 
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001 
Tampering with Witness 2° 17 Case No. 011905093FS 
1 Champneys, "where is it?" and she says, "Well, I think it must've fallen down the drain/' 
2 hoping, I think, you can infer, that "Oh, it's gone. Oh, it's too late." When in fact, it was in 
3 her hand the whole time. She knew it was in her hand because the officer found it there in 
4 her hand. And that she told the officer something different, trying to conceal it. 
5 J: Anything else, Mr. Finlayson? 
6 ATD: No. 
7 J: If the jury chose to believe those facts, Ms. Champneys, and counsel, I believe that they 
8 could find you guilty of this offense based on this evidence that you picked it up after the 
9 officer had set it on the counter allegedly at least. There was a stnjggle when it might have 
10 fallen down the sink and you thought - you told the officer you thought it had, but in fagt, 
11 you were concealing it in your hand. It would meet the definition technically speaking at 
12 least, as I understand it. If in fact, it was your intent to hide it in your hand and mislead the 
13 officers in thinking that maybe it had gone down the sink. I'll deny the motion to dismiss 
14 Count I. I find there's sufficient evidence to support all three charges, enter a not guilty plea, 
15 and have this matter set before one of the other judges of this Court for a scheduling 
16 conference. 
17 Case bound over. 
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3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson? 
5 MR. FINLAYSON: Good morning Your Honor. We have a 
6 co-defendant. Mr. Anderson and I have a co-defendant case 
7 that's resolved. We can handle that. It's No. 9, Rebecca 
8 Champneys. 
9 THE COURT: Oh, yes and I believe Mr. Anderson has 
10 Ms. Corwell? 
11 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
12 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Ms. Corwell is standing beside 
13 me. 
14 THE COURT: And I assume Ms. Champneys is here. Here 
15 she is. 
16 MR. FINLAYSON: She is, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, there is two files for 
19 Champneys. 
20 MR. ANDERSON: If I may approach Your Honor? 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Oh, yes, I was 
22 about to ask for that. All right. The matters before me are 
23 State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys Case #011905093 and State 
24 of Utah vs. Lisa Corwell, #011905094. These matters were 
25 consolidated and set for trial on Monday next and it looks like 
1 both the defendants are present and so where are we today? 
2 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, let me ask you, sometimes 
3 the wheels move faster than you think they are going to but I 
4 got a call from West Valley that they were going to send a case 
5 over on Rebecca from West Valley and I think Evelyn called. 
6 COURT CLERK: Murray. 
7 MR. FINLAYSON: Was it Murray? 
8 THE COURT: I got something from Murray. 
9 MR. FINLAYSON: I guess because they found out we 
10 were going to resolve these, they sent it over and we have a 
11 resolution on that case is you'd like to do it today as well? 
12 THE COURT: They just thought I needed a little more 
13 work? Now, if I sent one to Murray there would be hell to pay. 
14 I'll take the case as long as there's a resolution. 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: My understanding, Your Honor, is that 
16 both Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell are going to plead guilty to 
17 a third degree attempt at tampering with evidence and we have, 
18 it would be a plea under State vs. Sery, reserving their right 
19 to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 
20 MR. LEMCKE: That is the State's understanding, Your 
21 Honor. 
22 MR. FINLAYSON: And then for Ms. Champneys she's also 
23 going to plead guilty to a an attempt on Count 1 of the case 
24 ending in #0772 to a Class A. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Let me see if I have this right. 
2 
1 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Corwell is going to plead to 
3 attempted tampering, a third, Mr. Anderson, is that right? 
4 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: And Counts 2 and 3 dismissed? 
6 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. And again Your Honor 
7 the State agreed (inaudible) State vs. Sery. 
8 THE COURT: Which, so everybody is clear on that, 
9 means you can appeal it. 
10 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: I don't have any objection to that. I 
12 always encourage appellate review on any decisions I may make. 
13 Okay. Statements have been prepared for both these ladies? 
14 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: And have you both reviewed them with your 
17 respective clients? 
18 MR. FINLAYSON: I have, Your Honor. 
19 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Do you believe they understand them? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Champneys, let me ask you a couple of 
23 questions and then I'm going to ask you and Ms. Corwell some 
24 questions together but as far as you're concerned, Ms. 
25 Champneys, you have read through the document that Mr. 
4 
1 Fmlayson has there for your signature ultimately here toda>? 
2 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes, I have. 
3 THE COURT: And did you have plenty of time to 
4 discuss the matters contained in that document with him? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I did. 
6 THE COURT: The reason I ask that is, I don't anybody 
7 to be rushed because the decisions we're making here today are 
8 important decisions as far as you're concerned and I don't want 
9 you giving up any rights that you may have without the full 
10 opportunity to consider those. Do you believe you've done 
11 that? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I believe I have, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Ms. Corwell, same question. Have you 
14 reviewed the statement that Mr. Anderson has there for you? 
15 Have you had plenty of time to do that? 
16 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Do you believe you understand it? 
18 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Do you also understand the importance of 
20 the rights that you give up by pleading guilty that are 
21 contained in that document? 
22 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: You both understand that when a person 
24 pLeads guilty to a Third Degree Felony that the potential 
25 maximum sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison that can be 
5 
1 as long as five years and a fine that can be as high as $5,0?C. 
2 You both understand that? 
3 DEFENDANT CORNELL: (inaudible). 
4 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: Answer out loud please. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: Answer out loud. 
7 THE COURT: Ms. Champneys as far as you're concerned, 
8 there's a Class A Misdemeanor in this Murray case, attempted 
9 forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor carries a potential of a year in 
10 the county jail and a fine as high as $2,500. Do you 
11 understand that's a possibility on the Class A Misdemeanor? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I do. 
13 THE COURT: Does the statement cover both of these 
14 cases on the same document? 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: It does, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Champneys, you understand 
17 that if I thought it was necessary to incarcerate you on both 
18 these cases, at the State Prison, I could make the sentences 
19 run consecutively. In other words, when you finished one, the 
20 other would start. Do you understand that's always a 
21 possibility? 
22 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative) 
23 THE COURT: Now, what's going to happen in sentencing 
24 I don't know. I haven't made up my mind on this. I haven't 
25 even given it any thought at all, I don't know (inaudible) and 
6 
1 I won't make up my mind until I'm here on the sentencing day 
2 and I've read the pre-sentence reports and I have the benefit 
3 of what the two of you say and what your attorneys have to say 
4 and what the State's attorney has to say. That's when I'll be 
5 making that decision. Both of you understand that? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
8 THE COURT: Now, if you give up your right to have a 
9 trial which is scheduled next Monday, do you both understand 
10 that you give up an important and significant constitutional 
11 and statutory rights as outlined in the paper you both read? 
12 Do you both understand that? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
14 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
15 THE COURT: I want you also to understand that some 
16 of those rights I want to talk with you about today, just to 
17 make sure that I'm satisfied you're clear. If you plead 
18 guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that? 
19 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
20 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
21 THE COURT: Do you want to give up your right to 
22 have a trial next Monday? 
23 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
24 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
25 THE COURT: If there's no trial then you don't get to 
7 
1 testify because there won't be anybody to testify to. If we 
2 did try this case, both of you, if you chose, wouldn't have to, 
3 but if you chose, could testify and tell the jury what occarrea 
4 or did not occur in connection with these cases. Do you both 
5 understand you're giving up that right? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative^ . 
7 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
8 THE COURT: Also, I want you to understand that if 
9 you plead guilty, you are giving up you right to confront your 
10 accusers and what that means is the people that would be called 
11 by the State in an attempt to convince a jury that you 
12 committed this crime you're charged with. Your attorney won't 
13 have the right to cross examine them and test their credibility 
14 and point out any inconsistencies in their testimony and you 
15 won't get to see them here in the courtroom. Do you both 
16 understand you're giving up that right? 
17 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
18 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
19 THE COURT: Both of you at this point in time, are 
20 presumed innocent. As far as I'm concerned, you did not commit 
21 these crimes and that won't change ^ntil you tell different if 
22 you do here today. But if we tried this case, I would require 
23 the jury to think the same way. In other words, they could not 
24 sit on the jury unless they agreed that they would start the 
25 case on Monday with the two of you presuming that you were both 
8 
1 innocent and I would tell them that that presumption would nave 
2 to follow this case unless and until, if the State could, prove 
3 you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But otherwise, the 
4 presumption of innocense stays with you. The State doesn't put 
5 on any evidence, the verdict is not guilty because the 
6 presumption of innocense assumes and presumes that you are not 
7 guilty. That all goes away if you say guilty here today. Do 
8 you both understand that? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
11 THE COURT: Do you both want to give up your right 10 
12 the presumption of innocense? Both want to give that right up? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
14 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
15 THE COURT: Okay. You recall that I mentioned the 
16 State has to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
17 That's a very high standard of proof and the burden of proof is 
18 always on the State. Neither one of you has any obligation to 
19 prove that you did not commit this crime. You can put on 
20 evidence if you wanted to but you're not required to. The 
21 burden of proof always stays with the State and if the State 
22 could not convince every member of the jury that you committed 
23 these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, a high standard of 
24 proof, then the jury finds you not guilty. Do you both 
25 understand you're giving up that opportunity? 
9 
1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative . 
2 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
3 THE COURT: Now, you both pleaded guilty on your 
4 respective cases to attempted tampering with evidence. The 
5 State claims that these third degree felonies were committed at 
6 1990 West North Temple here in Salt Lake County on March 13~ 
7 of this year and there the State claims that each one of you, 
8 believing that there was an official proceeding or an 
9 investigation going on, that you either altered, destroyed, or 
10 attempted to alter, destroy, or conceal evidence in connection 
11 with that investigation. Is that true? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
13 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: What's the factual statement here? 
15 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, on March 13 at 1990 West 
16 North Temple, after seeing police officers and having verbal 
17 communications with a police officer at a hotel room 
18 (inaudible) did attempt to conceal materials (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: Is that correct as far as a factual 
20 statement is concerned, Ms. Corwell: 
21 MS. CORWELL: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Same thing for Ms. Champneys? 
23 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor, Ms. Champneys was 
24 with Ms. Corwell. 
25 THE COURT: Are those the facts here, Ms. Champneys? 
10 
1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirnati-e . 
2 THE COURT: So, I'm entering your guilty pleas here 
3 today. Ladies, you believe you're guilty of what: you're 
4 oleading guilty to? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
6 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 THE COURT: Have either one of you consumed an 
8 alcoholic beverages in the last 24 hours? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Shakes head in the negative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative). 
11 THE COURT: Have either one of you taken any drugs of 
12 any kind, prescription or otherwise? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I have, prescription. 
14 THE COURT: What kind of prescription, Ms. Champneys? 
15 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I take (inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: And does that effect your ability to 
17 think clearly? 
18 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: No. 
19 THE COURT: So do you believe you're thinking clearly 
20 right now? 
21 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Corwell, any drugs of any kind? 
23 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative). 
24 THE COURT: Do you believe you're thinking clearly? 
25 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
11 
1 THE COURT: Is there anything I've said about the 
2 rights that you're giving up or what we discussed about this 
3 plea arrangement that is unclear to either one of you? 
4 Anything unclear? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
6 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 THE COURT: Any questions you want to ask me before 
8 you offer a guilty plea? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, anything else either one of you 
12 would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: I have nothing, Your Honor. 
14 MR. FINLAYSON: No Your Honor, we do have the Class A 
15 on Ms. Champneys too. 
16 THE COURT: Oh yeah. 
17 MR. ANDERSON: I can provide a factual basis for 
18 that. On July 18th at 2120 South State, Ms. Champneys 
19 attempted to utter writing a check, pass a check purporting to 
20 be acting with another to do fraud and that she had reason to 
21 believe the check was a bad check. 
22 THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Champneys? 
23 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: That's what happened on July 18th, you 
25 tried to pass a bad check? 
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1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: You knew it was not a good check? 
3 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: So do you believe you're guilty of that 
5 Class A Misdemeanor? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes, I do. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke, anything else on the Rule A 
8 requirements? 
9 MR. LEMCKE: No, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: You may sign the statement, ladies, if 
11 you choose to at this point in time. 
12 MR. FINLAYSON: The (inaudible) have been signed, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 MR. ANDERSON: May we approach, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Please. 
16 All right. Ms. Champneys, for the record then to the 
17 attempted tampering of evidence, a third degree felony charge, 
18 claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt 
19 Lake County on March 13th, 2001, is charged in the case ending 
20 5093, how do you plead? 
21 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Guilty. 
22 THE COURT: Turning to the second case 0011918743, 
23 the one that came in from Murray, you are charged with 
24 attempted forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor, claimed to have 
25 occurred at 2120 South State Street here in Salt: Lake County on 
13 
1 July 18 of 2001, how do you plead? 
2 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Guilty. 
3 THE COURT: The record will show that I reviewed tne 
4 statement and along with the discussions I've had with Ms. 
5 Champneys, I believe that her pleas are properly given and 
6 knowingly given. I think she understands her rights that she 
7 gives up and also the potential consequences and therefore I've 
8 signed the statement and I accept the two pleas. 
9 I assume the State's motions then to dismiss Count 2 
10 and 3 in 5093? 
11 MR. LEMCKE: The State does, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And Count 2 in 8743? 
13 MR. LEMCKE: The State does, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Now, Ms. Corwell, you're charged now with 
15 attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, 
16 claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt 
17 Lake County on March 13th of 2001. On that charge, how do you 
18 plead? 
19 MS. CORWELL: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: Guilty? The State's motion to dismiss 
21 Counts 2 and 3? 
22 MR. LEMCKE: It is, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: So ordered. I've signed the statement 
24 that Ms. Corwell has executed . I believe there's a factual 
25 basis for the guilty plea and I also believe that she 
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1 understands the rights that she gives up and the potential 
2 consequences and has voluntarily entered her plea. 
3 Okay. Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, having pled 
4 guilty to a third degree felony and a Class A Misdemeanor and a 
5 third degree felony, I advise you that you have the right to be 
6 sentenced not earlier than two nor more than 45 days from 
7 today's date. 
8 I assume you want pre-sentence reports on both these 
9 ladies? 
10 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: February 1st? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: That's fine, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson? 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: That's fine, Judge. 
16 THE COURT: I'll set the, I'll refer these matter to 
17 the Adult Probation and Parole for preparation of a pre-
18 sentence report. Sentencing set for September 1st at 9:00. 
19 Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, I'm going to give you 
20 a referral to Adult Probation and Parole. The first order of 
21 business is to be in contact with them. Do not delay. Because 
22 of the holiday period coming up, the time frame for getting 
23 pre-sentence reports done is lessened. People are in the 
24 office less than they usually are. Do not fail to contact 
25 them. Do not fail to follow through on the pre-sentence 
15 
1 report. If that occurs and you get here on February 1 ana I 
2 don't have a pre-sentence report because you haven't made any 
3 effort to do it then I sentence you without it and you don't 
4 want me to do that. You've seen what happens today. So, make 
5 this a priority to get the pre-sentence report done. It will 
6 be to your advantage. While I recognize there's an objection 
7 to the Court's finding as you've both signed off on the form on 
8 the findings of facts and conclusion? 
9 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
10 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: I will sign those now including the order 
12 in both cases and I will see you all on the 1st of February. 
13 MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
15 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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23 
24 
25 (C) 
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AND ORDER 
CASE NO. OdS^M.1 
CCMES NOW /~<2a ( drj)ri\ ;;e i„e:enaan: i: 
• =*se and hereby acknowledges and certifies the folic wing 
A. 
I am entering a pLea '''f' • f• 
CRIME & STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
UC/tS 7(o-%-StO 
! i i II 
SEGRSE 
' i i 1 r ' m a i c i 
PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
B, 
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I cL* 
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3/1/99 
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I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s) 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: Vl«t *n* »r *t>*,t AarrA fS. XV)f *(* Hf0{/>** farfA 
>f.^uj u s,rt/sko&,,<!, .side *{fi<LL n* Jf^iJ. 
V'«ffo (Utr,,r cffkhifW&Jfif l*o**>jA^<unife*f>yt 
My'conduct, and the conduct of other persons for wnich I am ' 
c r imina l ly l i a b l e , t h a t cons t i t u t e s the elements of the crime(s) 
charged i s as follows:. 
nf{s ,d<J b> r*iArP^( ***{<,>*(* T&J toy*(a \*,*«.'^ 
Hi >Ac>e*.&«*{h"> 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
-J 
have not! 'have «a-\ei di i j i, counsel. If I have 
waived or, rijiy * counsel i nave i; e s: tn:wm ifLy, intelligent!/ 
and voluntas 1 1 * ' , ^  f ! M ^ n j reasons 
3 r f T h3«; waived my right to c: ur.se 1, I VJ . .ia: tv.^ s 
statement aril 'understand the nature an i elements of trie charges rry 
rights in this case ani other proceedings and the <~:r ** -i-^c
 :f 
my plea . f guilt/, 
If 1 h^ve-nct waived m, i \ j i, i ^_-^ it attorney 13 
(//[fi^R L MAJ/^/^I^\ and 1 have hail in opportunity to fully 
discuss this statement,, m, r 13h15 and the ccnsequences of m, guilty 
p lei w 1> I" 1, in11 attorney, 
l Hrn f'lMl' T have a right fn a trial in open :ourt by an 
1mparl1.il jury, an J tmat 1 am giving up "that right by pleading 
guilty. 
6. I know that If T w:„'i to tuv* a t;>ai 1 have tte r.jh 
confront; arid cross-examine witnesses against me 1 ",*- have tne.n 
cress-examined by my attorne, I 315 Knew t.iat 1 vrTe tne ngnc 
to compel my witness(si by subpoena a" State expense I. testify in 
court in my behalf. 1 undprqt-<n , M
 n 1 im giving up tnese rigncs 
if I plead guilty. 
7. I know thai 1 n.tje 1 riynt to testify in m( .wn behalf 
but. ,1 L Uhoose rv-r '• ) do s- 1 cannot be compelled t:; testify or 
give evidence against myself and iv, adverse inferences will be 
dravv against me 1. f 1 1; v :^ testify 1 understand that 1 am 
giving up these rights if 1 plead guilty. 
1 1 knew that if 1 wis/i to contest t:'e charge against me I 
need only plead "net guilty" and the matter W L I L b*3 set trir t.-i-. 
£r the trial the State of Utah will have Lie l.urden :£ pr:vmg earn 
element of the charge beycn.i 3 reasimat Le d'i"Lhr f "* tn^ . r"" - J ' 
before a wry the verdii"*1 rfin / h^ - unanimous. 
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9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the 
right of a presumption of innocence. I understand that I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead 
guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have cne 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these 
rights if I plead guilty. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to 
an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense. I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine or both. I know that in addition to a 
fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to 
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this 
plea agreement. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for an additional amount, if my plea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
-5-
i ' ' i«'row and understand that by pleading guilt. i 
waiving and giving up ;ny statutory and constitution. *! r::^ta- r? 
out m one preceding paragraphs , also Ln:w tha* by enter.r; 5.:; 
plea. 5] I am admitting and do so a tin, t thit I have committed the 
conduct allege:! an:i 1 am "in: If,1 " i- • -* rrimeis'' for wr.:ch iny 
plea^s^is'are entered. 
14, My plea i :i i .! juii"/ iij is n c ^ the result cf a plea 
bargain between myself and f:he prosecuting attorney. The promises, 
duties ai;d provisions of" th 3 plpa bargain, if a:.j, aid fully 
contained * * this statement. 
13 I !• ri">- a*d understand that if 1 desire t: witnora. ny 
plea(S' or guilty and there is a legal basis to do so, TII • r ;,a 
a motion within thirty ( jm days after-ia-ncgy of «iy"ybes> 
16 I knew t'hat any charge u sentencing- concession or 
recommendation of probation «JI suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the cnarjes for jentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel, or tine prosecuting attorney are not. binding on tne 
Judge. 1 a Is: know tnat an/ opinions tney express to me a 5 *:: what 
t"1*'/ believe the C-i|i:t may do are al.se not binding on tne Court. 
1
 "' i threats, coercion, :r unlawful influence of any kind 
have teen made to induce me t: plead .jutlty, and :r promises -- ,,:,n'" 
those contained in this statement, have beer niaie t;; p".j 
15, 1 have red \ this statement, ; I nave had it red! ' . ILT 
by nr, attorney, and 1 understand its pri'/isuns. I knew tn.3/ ' -\r 
free to change or delete anything contained i.n this statement. 
;r; not wish to make any cha^e" yp-^n?- i I • f the statements are 
correct. 
19. - -if" i > '" i p i I i. , i.e advice and assistance cf my 
attorney. 
-6-
20. I am >^Q> years of age; I have attended school through 
the /(/> grade and I can read and understand the English language, 
or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s) . 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea, and free of any mental disease, defect cr 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
Dated this T d a v of Uese^bcr 
EFEINMNT D  J 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I c e r t i f y t h a t I am the a t t o rney for L)yn (j^/"UJ C*' I , 
the defendant above, and t h a t I know he/she has r ead the s t a t emen t 
or t h a t I have read i t t o h im/her and I have d i s c u s s e d i t wi th 
h im/her and b e l i e v e t h a t he / she f u l l y unders tands the meaning of 
i t s con ten ts and i s menta l ly and phys i ca l ly competent. To the b e s t 
of my knowledge and b e l i e f , a f t e r an appropr ia te i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the 
elements of the c r ime(s) and the f ac tua l synops i s of the 
defendant ' s c r imina l conduct a re c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d and t h e s e , along 
wi th the o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and d e c l a r a t i o n s made by the 
defendant i n the foregoing a f f i d a v i t / a r e , a c c u r a t e and t r u e . 
£25? 
.TTORNEY' FOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I c e r t i f y tha i I am the a t t a r , , j ta -e nf rJtah in the 
: a 5 e a g a i n s t / i 2J^I_ ( r,fuu i t ' , _ _ _ t i e f endant nave 
rsviewea tn , 7, Statement ?f Tefendant and find t h a : the f a c t u a l 
bas^s „ i,. -J defendant > ' r i n m a l conduct which c o n s t i t u t e s the 
c f fense 5 1 < t rue ani c o r r e c t . No improper inducements, t n r e a t s 
c : e i e r ' i i r c 11 j encourage a p lea have been : f f e red defendant The 
p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s are ful ly c o n t a i n e a in ti e Statement: an i , t ne 
a t t ached Plea Agreement cr a& supplemented :/ tae r. e . : / d oef = trie 
Cour t . ''.ere i s reasonable cause t , lce. eve t a"; *""e r n c e n c e 
would suppor t t ae o n v i c t l o n 1? defenianc f i r trie c f fense ( s f i r 
which the p lea ts^ I s ' a r e entered and trip acceptance of the p l e a . s 
would s e rve m e , ." ' ' > m e r e s t , 
r
~ ,; -
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
ORDER 
Based on the fac ts sat f o r t h in Lie foregoing Stateme:/ : I M 
the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of the defendant and ;:ounself the Tcurt wi tnesses 
the s i g n a t u r e s and finds the d e f e n d a n t ' s n l e e i s i ot g u i l t 1 ' 
f r e e l y and vo i un t a r 1.1 y mad- " ' 1,1 ;<: 11 ie re i t ha *' t ' e 
defendant1 ' s p l ea 1 s c t gu i l ty ' ' « har/- ' - r • w f - r fc '• * n t/;«e 
Statement be accepted and e n t e r e d . / 
Dated t h i s ,/;, A^C^^C^— , irjd 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Addendum G 
1U TUP! UTAH '".'i 'HPT )bl Ai'PEAU 
00O00 
State of Utah,, 
J' 1 11 i l l J I ! rii 11 i A p p e I i e t - i , 
riLtD 
:
 Court of Appeals 
• ' n^o7 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
L i z a V i c t o r i a Co rwe11, 
De£ endai it: ai i> :i Appe 11 a n t . 
ORDER 
Case Nn ; ;oo?014^ -CA 
o\v)o Sow 
This matter is before the court on Appellant's motions to 
stay the appeal and temporarily remand the case to allow the 
trial court to rule on Appellant's pending motion, to v/ithdraw her. 
guilty plea. 
I T I S H E R E B Y ORDERED that this matter is temporarily 
remanded to the Third District Court for a ruling on Appellant's 
pending motion to withdraw her guilty plea. If the trial court 
denies the motion, Appellant shall file an amended notice of 
appeal under the same appellate case number. If the trial court: 
grants the motion, Appellant shall "inform the court of any 
circumstances which have transpired subsequent to the filing of 
the appeal which render moot: one or more of the issues raised."' 
Utah R. App, P, 3 7, 
x. _ /J^IHER ORDERED that the appeal is stayed pending 
disposition of the motion in the trial court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June, 2002, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a 
personal representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be 
delivered to: 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
KENT R. HART 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney 
General's Office to be delivered to: 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in 
Interdepartmental Mailing to be delivered to: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in 
Interdepartmental Mailing to be delivered to the judge listed 
below: 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
By /yl/MUuf ^Jlt^/cx^cL^X J 
Deputy Clerk "/ 
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 011905094 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. ANDERSON: No. 14, your Honor, Liza Corwell. 
THE COURT: All right. State of Utah vs. Liza 
Corwell, it's Case No. 011905094. 
I have for consideration today a motion to withdraw 
plea filed by the defendant. I've received the moving papers 
and the responding papers, I've also received a remand from 
the Court of Appeals remanding the matter back here for the 
purpose of this hearing. 
I have reviewed the plea colloquy transcript and 
also the file with regard to the plea statement that Ms. 
Corwell signed. 
Now, are you ready to proceed? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Be glad to hear from you. 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, as we indicated before, I 
feel that we've adequately set forth our position in the 
memorandum and I believe Ms. Taylor is in agreement and we 
would submit if the Court—unless the Court had any questions 
from us. 
THE COURT: Agree? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, let's make sure the record's clear 
here so the Court of Appeals knows what I'm doing. 
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understand that. And that—and I understand that that's Ms. 
Taylor's position, that there was substantial compliance and 
that the Court can look at those things. 
I simply, in my motion, went through, your Honor, 
and pointed out what had not been stated in the verbal 
colloquy. 
THE COURT: And so, do you have any case law from 
the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals that says the 
entire—all the rights that need to be discussed under Rule 11 
have to be orally stated? 
MR. ANDERSON: I do not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: As a matter of fact, don't the cases 
that started this whole discussion say that it can be oral and 
written? 
MR. ANDERSON: It can be supplemented by written, 
that's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Do you agree that the written 
statement covers all the items you've talked about? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. It does. 
THE COURT: It—it doesn't say speedy trial. The 
statement doesn't say speedy trial? 
MR. ANDERSON: It does not. 
THE COURT: The record needs to show in this case, I 
took this plea on a Friday and the trial was Monday. 
MR. ANDERSON: I understand that, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Can't get much speedier than that. 
MR. ANDERSON: I—I am aware of that. 
THE COURT: Your client was aware that I—we—we 
were going to trial on Monday, but she offered a plea? 
MR. ANDERSON: I believe from reviewing the record, 
your Honor, you advised her of that fact. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Well, I don't think I missed 
anything here and the fact that she didn't understand felony 
versus misdemeanor is not something that's the subject of a 
motion to withdraw the plea. 
Unless there's something else, I'm—I find that 
either through my oral colloquy with Ms. Corwell or—or and in 
conjunction with the written statement that she said she'd 
reviewed and understand, that her rights under Rule 11 were 
all properly—properly explained to her. 
A couple of these don't meet the criteria of being 
harmful. Even if I didn't tell her about the time limit for 
filing her motion to withdraw the plea, which of course, the 
statement does, she did and I'm hearing it, so obviously, that 
doesn't—there's no harm there. 
Consecutive sentences doesn't—that doesn't apply, 
she only pled guilty to one crime here. So, I don't see any 
harm there, either, 
So, in any event, for those reasons, the motion is 
denied, the plea will stand and Ms. Corwell was advised. So, 
5 
1 I decline to consider that. 
2 I am going to now, as soon as I get an order—will 
3 you send me an order, please, Ms. Turner? 
4 MS. TURNER: Yes. Do you need findings? 
5 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
6 MS. TURNER: Do you need findings of fact and 
7 conclusions of law with that? 
8 THE COURT: Well, I think so, yes. The Court of 
9 Appeals may want to revisit this matter. 
10 MS. TURNER: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: If they do, let's see if you have to say 
12 all the words orally, if you do, things are going to change 
13 around here radically; in other words, you'll all be here a 
14 lot longer. 
15 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
17 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the 
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of 
September, 2002. 
/ j 
-Jpfic s*£t 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day 
of September, 2002. 
03h " 
Zr^s oca 
Notary 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah, 
do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge, 
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except 
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings 
were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 24th day
 Qf 
September,. 20Q£±„ 
j "<-^' ,;• • i , Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
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Addendum I 
DAVID E YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801)363-7900 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 1 \ 2002 
WM Deputy C'erk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v -
LIZA CORWELL, 
Defendant 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION 
AND WITHDRAW PLEA 
Case No 011905094 
Hon Timothy R Hanson 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction 
and Withdraw Plea is denied 
DATED this JJ_ day of Odtlkj<^ 20j 
5royed as to Form 
BY THE coy&t,;. 
'atnckL Anderson 
Attorney for the Defendant 
3 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-v -
Case No. Oil905094 
LIZA CORWELL, 
Hon. Timothy R Hanson 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for a Motion to Vacate Conviction and Withdraw Plea 
hearing on June 21, 2002, before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District 
Court Judge, presiding. The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana 
Taylor. The Defendant was present and represented by Patrick L. Anderson. The Court, 
based upon the arguments presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted 
by counsel, and for good cause shown, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 7, 2001, a pretrial conference was held in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. The defendant was present and represented by counsel. 
3. The defendant reviewed and signed a plea form, prepared by her attorney, 
which advised her of all of the rights she was giving up by entering a plea of guilty. 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
CCT 1 1 2002 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
1 
4 On the record, Judge Hanson reviewed most of those same rights with the 
defendant 
5. Judge Hanson asked the defendant if she understood the rights he had 
reviewed with her, which were contained in the plea form, and asked her if she was 
willing to waive those rights, to which the defendant replied, "yes " 
6 The defendant then pled guilty to the Third Degree Felony charge of 
Attempted Tampering with Evidence 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The Judge substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2 The defendant's plea to the felony charge of Attempted Tampering with 
Evidence was made knowingly and voluntarily. 
3 The conviction in this case was lawfully entered and there is no legal 
reason why it should be vacated. 
DATED this \j_ day of U(Tb(j<^ , 2002 
BY^HECQU^T, r ^ 
Appptfecfts to Form: 
Patrick f Anderson 
Attorney for the Defendant 
HSTRICT^JUDGE ; > 
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Not Reported in P 2d 
2002 UTApp 124 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 574333 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Jamison Z CULLEY, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20010544 CA. 
April 18,2002 
John R Bucher, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Mark Shurtleffand Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee. 
Before BENCH, ORMh and THORNE, JJ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion 
for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
The district court entered its Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment on April 2, 1999 On June 7, 2001, 
Appellant filed a "Motion for Entry of Misplea and 
Motion to Correct A Sentence That Was Imposed In An 
Illegal Manner Pursuant to Rule 22(e) Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure" m which he sought a new trial or 
a declaration of a misplea. The district court correctly 
construed the motion as a motion for new trial or 
motion to withdraw guilty plea based upon the relief 
requested A motion under rule 22(e) presumes a valid 
conviction and challenges only an allegedly illegal 
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 
See State \> Brooks 908 P 2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) ("A 
request to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) 
presupposes a valid conviction."). The motion in this 
case challenged the validity of Appellant's guilty plea 
and resulting conviction, not the validity of the sentence 
alone. 
The district court denied the motion for new 
trial/motion to withdraw guilty plea as untimely in an 
unsigned minute entry. Appellant filed a notice of 
appeal from the unsigned minute entry In response to 
this court's sua sponte motion, Culley has merely filed 
copies of the original 1999 judgment and the unsigned 
minute entry and has not demonstrated any basis for our 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
It is well settled that an unsigned minute entry is not a 
final appealable order and the appeal must be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction on that basis See, e g, State \ 
Rowlings. 829 P .2d 150, 153 (Utah CtApp.1992) 
("[A]n unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal"). In addition, Appellant did not file 
a timely appeal from the underlying judgment entered 
in this case on April 2, 1999, and Appellant's motion 
did not toll the time for appeal under Rule 4(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because it was 
untimely as a motion for new trial under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, entry 
of a signed order denymg the motion will not revive an 
appeal of the underlying judgment. 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
it is not taken from a final appealable judgment and 
because it is untimely if construed to be an appeal from 
the underlying judgment. 
2002 WL 574333 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 124 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum K 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen-
dant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insan-
ity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDLRE L l S ! ^ 5 y 
H i the defendant has been adwsed of the time limits for filing an> 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea, 
^^^rjjgjrjgj^gflj^^ 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated 
former Subdivisions (a) through (d) and (f) as 
present Subdivisions (1) through (4) and (8), 
respectively, and former Subdivision (e) as 
Subdivisions (5) and (7), divided Subdivision 
(1) into two sentences, substituting "The defen-
dant may" for "and shall" at the beginning of 
the present second sentence; substituted "may" 
for "shall" m the introductory language of Sub-
division (5), added "and" to the end of Subdivi-
sion (5)(f) and added Subdivision (5)(g); added 
Subdivision (6); substituted "may" for "shall" 
in Subdivision (8)(a); and made minor stylistic 
changes throughout the rule. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, 
revised the subdivision designations, substitut-
ing letters for numbers and vice versa, inserted 
"or guilty and mentally ill" in the introductory 
paragraph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivi-
sion (f), rewrote Subdivision (e)(3) to list more 
rights; inserted "and if applicable, the mini-
mum mandatory nature of the minimum sen-
tence" in Subdivision (e)(5), added Subdivision 
(e)(8), deleted "that contemplates entry of a 
plea in the expectation that other charges will 
be dropped or dismissed" after "has been 
reached" in Subdivision (h)(2), added Subdivi-
sion d); and made stylistic changes throughout 
the rule 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
Rule 410, U R E 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6 
